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 Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power in an Iranian state on the verge of 
disintegration and dominated by foreign powers.  In order to reverse this decline and 
protect national sovereignty, Reza sought to build a centralized state and strong national 
military modeled after those of Europe.  The military came to dominate affairs within the 
country by consuming a large percentage of the national budget and by the favoritism 
given to its officers.  The government also attempted to impose martial order on society 
by implementing conscription, requiring military instruction for students, and imposing 
national dress codes for citizens.  Reza's elevation of the military, heavy-handed style of 
governance, and the systemic corruption of his regime made it unpopular with much of 
Iran's population.  This thesis argues that Reza's reforms did much to alter the appearance 
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 In the course of my academic career I have paid particular attention to the 
acknowledgments of the texts that I have read.  I reached the conclusion that, very often, 
these had less to do with expressing thanks than they did with affording the author an 
opportunity for self aggrandizement.  Scholars mentioned lengthy trips to various 
archives in which they conducted unprecedented amounts of research.  They named 
numerous academic figures, intellectual goliaths, with whom they exchanged ideas.  They 
listed the scholarships, fellowships, and grants they received, all prestigious in nature, 
that supported them financially as they produced their scholarly masterpieces.  If, at any 
moment, they seemed overly gratuitous, it was only to embellish the merits of their 
product.  Now, being the cynic that I am, after having undertaken a substantial project of 
my own, I have not changed my mind on the matter, and this has led me to consider that 
one might consider my own acknowledgements to be a type of surreptitious self 
promotion.  Let me assure you that this is not the case.  I am genuinely thankful to a great 
many people who, in their respective ways, made the present work possible.  I could not 
have done it on my own. 
 Without the prodding and assistance of two teachers at my high school, Darlene 
Callahan and Tom Rudisill, I would never have gone to college.  I cannot thank them 
enough for refusing to allow me, in spite of my best efforts, to fall through the cracks.  I 
can only that hope I have lived up to their expectations.  As an undergraduate at the 
University of South Carolina, my curiosity was stimulated most by Dr. Kenneth Perkins, 
Dr. Tobias Lanz, and Dr. Waleed El-Ansary.  These individuals challenged, encouraged, 




Averett University, was the first to suggest that I pursue education at the graduate level, 
so I would be remiss to not credit or blame her for my coming to Maryland.  The example 
she set by simultaneously, and magnificently, performing the roles of student and parent 
helped me remain steadfast when I questioned my decision to become a graduate student.  
I must also thank the staff of the African and Middle Eastern Division of the Library of 
Congress, especially the IT specialist, for ensuring that I always found what I was 
looking for and never letting me leave empty handed.  The daunting task of conducting 
research was made feasible by the specialists at the National Archives in College Park, 
Maryland.  I must single out archivist Eric Van Slander for taking the time to familiarize 
me with the facility, to listen, patiently, while I explained my project, and to locate 
additional files that he thought may be of use.  Without his help, my trips to the archives 
would have amounted to an exercise in futility.   
 I have been fortunate to attend the University of Maryland and meet the people 
who make it such a remarkable institution.  My fellow graduate students have been a 
constant source of comfort, aid, and amusement.  Evan Norris, Alda Benjamen, and 
Harrison Guthorn have always been willing to listen to my ideas, however asinine some 
might have been, and offer constructive feedback.  Lejnar Mitrojorgji, as well, provided 
moral support and often helped me understand what I was trying to say when even I was 
not sure of the meaning.  I look forward to the day when I may purchase the books that 
my present colleagues have written and proudly remark that I once shared a classroom 
with them.  Maryland's faculty members are just as laudable.  Dr. Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak 
was instrumental in procuring the fellowship that allowed me to begin graduate study and 




the Persian language under the guidance of Ms. Delaram Soltani, and I am grateful to 
them both for their accommodation of my interests.  Dr. Julie Greene and Dr. Paul 
Landau challenged me to take my thinking in directions that I had never considered.  Dr. 
Madeline Zilfi, Dr. Peter Wien, Dr. Antoine Borrut, and Dr. Jon Sumida, in addition to 
overseeing this thesis, have been cherished mentors and critics.  Without their guidance, I 
would have long since lost my way.  Without their criticism, I would have settled for 
mediocrity.  Without their encouragement, I would have surrendered countless times by 
now.  In the past, I have always treasured the wit and wisdom of my teachers, recognized 
and valued their contributions to my life.  Those I have met at Maryland will be no 
different. 
 Finally, I must express my undying gratitude and eternal debt to my wife and son, 
Rachel and Logan.  Without so much as a complaint, they have endured my physical and 
psychological absence during my time in graduate school.  My wife has supported me 
financially, spiritually, and emotionally while my academic ambitions taxed all of those 
resources.  At times, she must have felt like a single parent, balancing work and home 
while I hid behind a wall of books or locked myself in a room and banged on a keyboard 
late into the night.  If she did, she never said so, or even let on as much.  My son has 
made enormous sacrifices for such a young age.  He has played in utter silence to avoid 
disturbing my studies and endured the pain of hunger when I, caught up in books, forgot 
that people need to eat.  Above all, he accepted that his father had little time for him, 
understood that our shared activities would be an afterthought performed with an eye 
turned toward the clock.  Together, they have graciously excused my virtual abdication of 




bother them.  I will never be able to repay, in a single lifetime, the love and forbearance 
that they have shown, but I resolve myself to make every effort to do so. 
 To all those I have mentioned and those whom my memory has neglected, I 
extend my most sincere and heartfelt thanks.  I could not have done this without you.  
Although many brilliant minds have made the present work possible, I must claim a 
monopoly on any errors or oversights contained herein.  They are my responsibility 
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 Reza Shah once said that he viewed everything in life as a cannon ball in flight.  If 
one stops moving forward, speeding inexorably toward a target, he is defeated1  His 
reasoning here helps to explain the nature of his rule.  First, it is a military metaphor from 
a military leader.  His reference point for life itself is the martial.  Considering this, it is 
only natural that the armed forces would be at the center of his thought.  Second, the 
metaphor introduces a theme of uncompromising progress.  A cannon ball, if deflected, 
will miss.  If it slows, it will fall short of its intended target.  Reza's analogy reveals him 
to be unrelentingly goal oriented.  One may negotiate with a cannon ball, but the shot will 
not negotiate in return.  Once in flight, it cannot be called back.   
 This study examines the role of the military in Reza Shah's Iran.  The primary 
argument of the thesis is that Iran, under Reza, took on the semblance of a Western state 
while lacking the substance.  Reforms were implemented which altered the appearance of 
the country, its military, and its people, but the underlying social order and power 
structure remained the same.  A deconstruction of the amorphous concept of "modernity," 
a term widely used in discussions of the country at this time, is crucial to understanding 
his policies and will be explored below.  This text will focus upon the central 
government's efforts to develop a strong military, specifically, a Western-modeled force, 
as well as its attempt to modernize Iranian society through militarization.  The main 
objective of this text will be to describe the foreign and domestic challenges faced by 
Reza Shah and to explain how and why his military-centered modernization program 
failed to meet them.   
                                                           
1 Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "Triumphs and Travails of Authoritarian Modernisation in Iran," in Stephanie 




 Reza rose to national prominence in 1921 before ascending to the throne five 
years later.  He inherited a state in turmoil, recently conquered in war, occupied by 
foreign powers, wracked by internal strife, and whose central government's authority did 
not extend far beyond the borders of Tehran.  Reza Shah's strategy to rectify the 
untenable security situation while centralizing the government and Westernizing the 
country was constructed around the military, which he saw as the foundation of a modern 
state.   
 The army that Reza developed was sufficient to address the main internal threat to 
the central government, that posed by rebellious tribes and domestic opponents.  
Confronting the foreign menace, however, was a more difficult issue.  Reza’s ambition 
was to develop an Iranian state that possessed the military capacity to counter European 
encroachment and regional competition.  Achieving such a goal in a short period of time 
was an impossible task that defied his best efforts.   
 In 1921, Iran was a backward state.  Its population was ethnically and 
linguistically heterogeneous, largely uneducated, and lived in isolated enclaves scattered 
throughout the countryside.  The country's rugged geography was virtually untouched by 
roads and railways, a situation that prevented economic development and hampered the 
central government's efforts to assert its authority over the periphery.  Simply put, the 
burden of military modernization, as envisioned by Reza, exceeded Iran's economic, 
technological, and social capacities.  Furthermore, by placing the military at the heart of 
his efforts, which included attempts to militarize society itself, Reza Shah prevented the 
development of other institutions essential to the creation of a modern state.2 
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 This text is organized into four chapters, each of which contains several sections.  
Chapter one discusses the historiography of Reza Shah's Iran, examines the notion of 
"modernization" in the historiography of Iran, addresses questions of military 
modernization, and then establishes a general picture of Iran's history through the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The first section is a discussion of relevant 
historiography and the position of this thesis within it.  Section two explores the various 
ways that historians have understood and approached "modernity" in Iranian history.  
Next, it discusses modernization in a military context, offering a definition of what 
constitutes a modern army.  The final section offers a brief chronology of Reza's rule and 
the years leading up to it.  It is a general overview of the events and developments that 
the bulk of this study will examine in greater detail. 
 In chapter two, the thesis looks at the origins of the reformist movement in Iran 
and its opponents.  The first section examines the state of Iran in 1921.  It looks at the 
country's geography, infrastructure, and population to present a picture of the difficulties 
facing Reza Shah's state-building project.  The second traces the development of Iranian 
nationalism and Reza's relationship with its proponents as he accumulated political 
power.  In the late 19th century, nationalist ideas began circulating through a new 
intellectual elite.  The Constitutional Revolution in 1905 gave nationalists a voice in 
government, but their ambitions for the country were thwarted by infighting and foreign 
invasion during the Great War.  Reza allied himself, first, with the more traditional 
elements of Iranian society before turning against them and pushing forward his program 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the sake of clarity and consistency.  For the same reason, I have chosen to refer to Iran by its present name 
rather than use "Persia" for events prior to 1935.  That year, Reza Shah decreed that the country would 
henceforth be known, officially, as Iran in an effort to foster a sense of nationalism and assert national 




of centralization and Westernization with the backing of the nationalist intelligentsia.  
The third section looks at opponents to Tehran's centralization policies before and during 
the early days of Reza's rule.  During this period, after the Great War had ended, Iran was 
fragmented by tribal forces and groups who opposed the government along ideological 
grounds.  Both Iran's nationalists and foreign observers felt that only a strong military 
under the control of the central government could save the country from disintegration.  
The chapter ends by showing the broad picture of attempts by Middle Eastern states to 
create Western-inspired militaries.  The final section ends with a discussion of the three 
primary military forces that existed in Iran in 1920.  These groups, the Gendarmerie, the 
Cossacks, and the South Persia Rifles, existed to serve the interests of the Iranian 
parliament, monarchy, and Britain respectively.  There was no unified national force to 
serve the central government. 
 Chapter three is dedicated to the reconstruction of the Iranian military and society 
under Reza Shah.  The first section is dedicated to the development of the armed forces.  
Although the military grew dramatically in size and could boast of possessing cutting-
edge weaponry, it retained many of the characteristics that hampered it during the Qajar 
period.  Systemic corruption went unchecked and officers were promoted, not based on 
merit, but on political reliability.  While the military's new equipment looked impressive 
in parades, it was difficult to maintain and coexisted with antiquated weaponry.  
Generally, Iran's armed forces under Reza Shah were shaped to intimidate opponents and 
were far less effective on the battlefield than they were on paper.  Section two deals with 
the attempt to impose martial order upon Iranian society.  Reza based his legitimacy on 
the fact that he was a successful military leader.  Thus, he wore his uniform to all public 





appearances to symbolize the military source of his political authority.  A privileged 
military elite composed mainly of his former Cossack comrades developed around him.  
By virtue of their relationship with Reza, these officers were able to act with virtual 
impunity.  They were free to overrule or impede the civilian leaders of the regions they 
were assigned to.  The armed forces were celebrated in public discourse as the guarantors 
of Iranian independence.  Their grandeur was inflated, almost comically, by books and 
newspaper articles.  Military service was presented as a prerequisite for citizenship, 
which was essentially a statement that a man would only become Iranian by donning a 
uniform and also one that placed women in a secondary position in society.  Boys were 
compelled to join scouting organizations, military drill became a standard part of 
education, and even adults, male and female, were subject to standardized dress codes.  
All of these together were designed to create a society that would readily defer to 
authority, namely, Reza Shah's authority, and that would conform to his image of 
"modern." 
 The final chapter is a study of the consequences of Reza's policies.  Section one 
looks at opposition to his rule from three sectors of society.  The traditionalists in Iran, 
religious officials and their supporters, strongly resented the state encroachment upon 
religion and policies that harmed them financially.  While there were examples of 
individuals resisting secularization efforts, by and large the religious leadership did not 
work to organize a coherent opposition movement.  The growing secular intelligentsia, in 
time, became dissatisfied with Reza's authoritarianism, corruption, and the lack of any 
outlet for political expression.  Individuals from this class tended to organize clandestine 




Even within the military, junior officers and regular soldiers objected to their subordinate 
status to the former Cossack elite.  These men were also willing to rebel in response to 
physical and financial abuses by their superiors.  Discussed in more detail in the last 
chapter, the most glaring example of opposition to Reza Shah's rule came in 1935 when a 
protest initiated by a cleric resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and even revealed 
fissures within the armed forces.  This event marked the point at which the position of the 
Pahlavi regime grew increasingly precarious until, by 1941, foreign observers felt that a 
revolution or coup was imminent.  Part four ends with an analysis of Reza's military in 
combat.  The army was an instrument of intimidation more than a potent fighting force.  
Its success was not assured, even against domestic opponents.  While it became 
increasingly more successful through time, the Allied invasion of 1941 exposed the 
operational shortcomings of the army.  The British and Soviet invaders crushed Iran's 
forces so quickly that many Iranians did not believe that they had actually attempted to 
defend the country. 
 Within a month of the Allied invasion, Reza Shah abdicated and was led into 
exile by the British.  Having lost the support of the Iranian people, he had relied upon the 
threat of military force to remain in power.  When the army was brushed aside, almost 
effortlessly, by the Allies, Reza's fate was sealed.  The defeat of the military robbed the 
shah of, not the guarantor of Iranian independence, but the defender of his throne.  His 
departure from the country was hardly an occasion for widespread mourning.  In the two 
decades that he wielded political power, Reza attempted to impose a new order upon the 
Iranian military and society.  The changes he brought about, even those that were to 




exposed by the invading Allied armies.  Faced by a real challenge, the facade of Reza's 
rule crumbled.  In the end, the unwavering, unflinching cannon ball of modernization was 




I.  Concepts and Chronology 
 
Reza's Rule in Iranian Historiography 
 In most texts on the history of modern Iran, Reza Shah is approached in a manner 
dependent upon the interests of the authors, at times even based on their personal opinion 
of him.  That Reza presided over Iran during a period of transformation is widely 
accepted.  It is the central motif in texts that deal with Iran in a general manner, those 
concerned with painting a broad picture of the country's history.  While there is 
agreement that changes occurred in Iran during Reza's reign, scholars are forced to 
reconcile the developments that took place with the less endearing attributes of his rule.  
The result is that authors must consciously frame reforms in comparison to the changes 
that did not take place.  The fruits of reform are presented as tainted by Reza's 
authoritarianism. 
 The Making of Modern Iran, a collection of essays edited by Stephanie Cronin, 
opens with the assertion that, under Reza Shah, "Iran underwent a profound 
transformation."3  Each chapter explores a particular area of Iranian history under Reza, 
such as the military or education, or an episode, such as Reza's visit to Turkey.  Although 
the various authors' findings are shaped by their topic, their common ground is that Iran 
was changing at this time.  Ali Ansari, in the introduction to Modern Iran Since 1921, 
bluntly states that his book is "fundamentally [...] about change and the politics of 
managing that change."4  When he deals with Reza Shah, he openly endorses the opinion 
that modern Iran is a product of Reza's reign.  Still, Ansari tactfully takes on a nuanced 
                                                           
3 Stephanie Cronin, ed. The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921-1941 




tone by pointing out the contradictions in Reza's rule, mainly the tension between his 
utilization of traditional patrimonial methods of leadership and his espoused push for 
modernization.5  Nikki Keddie, in Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796-1925, a 
book that follows the trajectory of the Qajar dynasty, takes a similar approach when 
discussing Reza Shah.  Like Ansari, she characterizes him as an ambitious, yet flawed, 
reformer.  The changes he made that helped to develop the country were offset by the 
effects of his personal avarice and brutality.6  M. Reza Ghods' book, Iran in the Twentieth 
Century, was written, in his words: "to illustrate the continuities and discontinuities in 
Iranian political history."7  The chapter dedicated to Reza Shah's reign conceptualizes 
three phases of his leadership.  This is a de facto presentation of his rule as a 
transformative epoch.  In spite of this presentation, however, Ghods tempers any 
discussion of reform by stating that Reza Shah "wanted to modernize Iran without 
altering the patrimonial structure of society, which was his main source of power."8  Each 
text relies upon a similar narrative that contrasts the drive for modernization with the 
continued dependence upon a traditional form of rule.   
 Iran: At War with History, by John Limbert, only slightly deviates from this 
formula.9  Like the others, Limbert emphasizes Reza Shah's push to transform the 
country, but he differs in that he does not connect the regime's authoritarianism and greed 
with traditional patrimonial rule.  Instead, he presents Reza Shah as an innovator, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Ali Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After (Harlow: Longman, 2003), 3. 
5 Ibid., 41. 
6 Nikki R. Keddie, Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796-1925 (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 
1999), 88. 
7 M. Reza Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1989), x. 
8 Ibid., 93-121. 




militantly opposed to all traditions that would undermine his reform efforts.  While 
Limbert’s decision to overlook the similarities between Reza’s rule and the practices of 
his predecessors might seem innocuous, it has significant ramifications for readers’ 
understanding of the Iranian military.  By portraying the shah as an innovative figure, one 
unencumbered by the history of Iran, readers could easily be left with the impression that 
Reza’s military was purely his own creation rather than an awkward amalgamation of 
two eras.  Differences aside, Limbert's text reinforces the notion that Reza's Iran was 
characterized by a national transformation under a repressive regime.  The motif of 
change is a prominent feature of the work. 
 Although Amin Banani, in The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, is more 
explicitly concerned with the material consequences of Reza's reforms, he uses a similar 
method of employing contrast.  In this case, Banani focuses upon the concentrated 
program of Westernization that took place under Reza Shah's guidance while identifying 
the underlying cause for this transformation as a deep-seated sense of inferiority.  There 
are two paradoxes here that Banani is concerned with: the Westernization of Iran during a 
period of nationalism, and the espousal of nationalism when a sense of inferiority is 
pervasive.  The two, he writes, were related.10  Reza's push for industrialization "beyond 
the bounds of economic rationale" and his attempts to force Iranians to alter their clothing 
were aimed at enhancing national prestige but were, ultimately, "an indiscriminate 
imitation of the surface gloss of Western societies."11  This reflects Reza Shah's 
indifference toward Western thought and fixation upon Western technology.  The veneer 
of modernization, its most outwardly visible aspects in Iran, is contrasted with the 
                                                           
10 For example Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 




absence of substantive social and ideological development in the country.  One must 
wonder how much Banani, writing in the early 1960’s, was reflecting on the policies of 
the second Pahlavi shah. 
 Other specialized texts follow a similar formula of presenting Reza's reign as 
overseeing an incomplete or flawed transformation.  In Iran Between Two Revolutions, 
which focuses upon Iranian society, Ervand Abrahamian writes that Reza brought about 
the initiation of many reforms but also sparked, what he terms, "the politics of social 
conflict."12  Looking at foreign policy, Rouhollah K. Ramazani writes in The Foreign 
Policy of Iran, 1500-1941, that Reza Shah's reign was a transitional period in which the 
concept of an Iranian national interest gained real traction.13  For the most part, Reza was 
cognizant of the relationship between his objectives, namely creating an independent and 
modern country, and the means at his disposal to accomplish this.  In his pursuit of 
independence for Iran, he sought to counterbalance British and Russian influence by 
courting other Western powers and strengthening ties with the neighboring states of 
Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  This realistic approach was not to be maintained, as Reza 
Shah eventually associated himself too closely with Germany before making the fatal 
mistake of either overestimating the Iranian military's ability to defend the country or 
misjudging British and Russian willingness to take military action against him.14  If 
Reza's rule was a transitional period to realistic foreign policy, the Allied invasion in 
1941 revealed, in no uncertain terms, that it was a transition left unfinished. 
 Stephanie Cronin and Steven Ward, in their respective works The Army and the 
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12 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Harlow: Princeton University Press, 1982), 165. 
13 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs 




Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910-1926 and Immortal, deal specifically with the 
Iranian military.  Cronin's text looks at the development of Iran's army in the decade 
preceding Reza's rise to power and its first five years under his control.  She finds that, 
while the military was undergoing a transformation in terms of recruitment and 
weaponry, it retained characteristics of the Qajar period, most notably corruption, that 
had an impact on its quality.15  What the text lacks in terms of chronological breadth, it 
makes up for with its attention to detail.  Steven Ward's book is more expansive in scope, 
reaching from ancient Persia to modern debates over Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.  It 
covers a wider period of time than Cronin’s work but does not offer the same degree of 
detailed analysis.  In his chapters on the reign of Reza Shah, Ward credits him with 
forging the modern army, but argues that it was "a growing yet hollow military."16  
Although the armed forces of Iran grew larger and acquired more modern weaponry 
through the 1930's, continued corruption and the poor quality of its officers limited its 
effectiveness.  Both of these authors essentially argue that Reza presided over a military 
that was outwardly changing while perpetuating many of the traits that hampered it under 
the Qajars.  It is a variation on the popular incomplete transformation motif. 
 The present study is in agreement with the aforementioned scholarship regarding 
the superficiality of Reza Shah's modernization project and some of the legacies of the 
Qajar era.  It synthesizes the work of various scholars mentioned above, but also holds 
that, as the military is acknowledged to have been at the center of Reza's state, the merits 
and deficiencies of the country's transformation are particularly noticeable in the Iranian 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 See Ibid., 171-310. 
15 Stephanie Cronin, The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910-1926 (New York: I. B. 
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armed forces.  The elevated position of the military and its relationship to the Pahlavi 
monarchy suggest that its handling is emblematic of Reza Shah's reign in general.  One 
contribution of this thesis is that it recognizes the centrality of the military in the 
construction of the modern Iranian state.  In Reza's Iran, the military was pervasive, and 
its fingerprints can be found in a great many of the reforms initiated during the interwar 
period.   
 While it looks at the entirety of Reza Shah's rule, this thesis is particularly 
interested in the final half of his reign, from the early 1930's until the Allied invasion in 
1941.  It was during this period that, with the tribal population largely subdued and oil 
profits on the rise, Reza was able to aggressively push forth his modernizing agenda.  
Iran's armed forces and citizens were both heavily subjected to the will of the shah at this 
time.  By looking more closely at the military during this period, the thesis attempts to fill 
a gap in the existing historiography.   
 Because of Britain’s historical involvement in Iran, British sources tend to have a 
favored position among scholars.  The majority of the secondary literature on Reza 
Shah's reign focuses squarely upon documents from the British foreign office on the 
grounds that Britain played the leading role in Iranian affairs.  While this approach may 
be justified, it ignores the archival collections of other countries that had interests in Iran, 
such as the Soviet Union, the United States, or Turkey.  This thesis introduces American 
diplomatic and military documents that previous scholars have typically mentioned only 
in passing or have overlooked altogether.  These documents reveal American observers to 
be, not just aware of Reza Shah's ambition to create a powerful military and militarized 
society, but fully cognizant that this agenda would lead to unrest within the country.  
                                                                                                                                                                             




Four decades before the Islamic Revolution brought down the Pahlavi regime, an 
American official warned that the population needed little more than a leader, an 
objective, and organization to cause havoc on the streets of Tehran.17  Other sources from 
the United States, specifically those related to Iranian weapons procurements, are used to 
reveal the superficial nature of Reza's modernizing reforms.  By examining the military at 
the time in which most of its development took place, and also by considering the 
observations of foreign officials, this thesis reveals the innate flaws in Reza Shah's 
modernization program that would eventually end his rule.18 
 
Modernization in Iran 
 As R.K. Ramazani writes in The Foreign Policy of Iran, "The essence of 
modernization is change," and that can involve any number of elements.19  A more 
pointed definition is to be found in Ali Ansari's Modern Iran since 1921.  To Ansari, 
modernization is "understood as the appropriation and assimilation of Western 
achievements."20  This allows for the inclusion of material development through 
industrialization and technological advancement while making room for intangibles.  
Western perspectives regarding government, of republicanism or socialism, even the 
dubious accomplishment of nationalism, adopted by Iranians, could all be seen as 
products of social modernization.  In both cases, modernization is a process, not a light 
switch.  A state may modernize slowly or rapidly, but it will not do so instantaneously.  
                                                           
17 Engert, "Dispatch 1254, March 14, 1938," G-2 Geographic File for Iran, Record Group 165, Box 
1661/File 3000, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
18 A fascinating path for future scholarship, unfortunately beyond the scope of the present study, would be 
to connect, explicitly, the arguments contained herein with the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
19 Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941, 9. 




Ansari states that Reza Shah oversaw the material modernization of the country, while 
modern political ideas first began to appear around the time of the Constitutional 
Revolution in 1906.  His reign managed Iran "from a perception of tradition to a 
particular conception of modernity."21  This definition conforms to the view alluded to by 
Nikki Keddie.  In Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796-1925, she also singles out 
the 1906 revolution as introducing reforms "based largely on Western models."22  Ervand 
Abrahamian, writing in Iran Between Two Revolutions, not only notes the importance of 
Western influence and the role of the revolution in bringing it to the forefront, but also 
discusses Western-inspired modernization efforts in the early nineteenth century.23  Rudi 
Matthee, in an article on Reza Shah's education reforms, writes, considering that many 
reforms were done "in conscious emulation of Western patterns," that likening 
modernization to Westernization is justified.24 
 Equating Westernization with modernization is quite common.  In Iran: At War 
with History, John Limbert makes virtually no distinction between the two.  Reza Shah, 
he writes, sought to create an Iranian nationalism that adopted "the material achievements 
of the West," and a modern military that could oblige citizens to "exchange their 
traditional way of life for Western economic and social models."25  Only the inclusion of 
Iranian nationalism makes Reza's effort anything more than a simple aping of Europe.  
Amin Banani's book, The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941, takes the impact of the West 
to the extreme.  Far from envisioning any sort of exchange or synthesis, Banani writes 
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that "one speaks today not of the interplay of civilizations, but of the impact of the West 
on the rest of the world."26  Such a statement would arouse the passions of any 
transnational historian, but, as the text was written in 1961, it must be placed in its 
historical context.  Iran, in 1961, was still under the control of the Pahlavi dynasty, 
aligned with the United States, and following a policy of aggressive Westernization.  The 
reign of Reza Shah, Banani argues, gave rise to "intense Westernization" that deeply 
influenced Iran, but it was only after his abdication that "the intellectual and ideological 
aspects of Western civilization, which had been forcibly kept out during the Reza Shah 
era, now flooded the country."27  This is not to say that Reza was wholly successful in his 
efforts to control intellectual developments.  Banani expresses a desire to write a sequel 
addressing those and other factors, such as Western influence on the arts or the status of 
women.  The point is, the focus of Reza Shah's modernization, or Westernization, was 
upon development with regard to the outward features of the state, not with the minds of 
its people.  In his vision, Iran's material transformation should come before, possibly 
even help to bring about, a change in the attitudes of Iranians. 
 Some texts are content to introduce the concept of modernity without an explicit 
definition of what it entails.  M. Reza Ghods, early in Iran in the Twentieth Century, 
frequently refers to Reza Shah's attempts at "modernization programs" and "nationalistic 
modernization" without explaining what they entailed, or to Iranians' perceptions of the 
shah as a "modernizing reformer" without an elucidation of the Iranian understanding of 
modernity.28  Westernization is downplayed to the point of omission.  Advocates of 
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modernization are not "Westernized," but often "European-educated,"29 or somehow in 
contact with Europeans.30  This silence on the nature of modernization leaves its meaning 
dependent upon the preconceived notions of the reader based on his or her background 
knowledge of Pahlavi rule or interpretation of the term.  Because Ghods never plainly 
states what modernity is, readers must look at how he represents Reza Shah's actions as a 
departure from his predecessors to formulate an understanding of the term.   
 Ghods points to the Qajars as lacking a centralized bureaucracy, strong military, 
or uniform legal system.  The arbitrary nature of their rule meant that property owners did 
not necessarily have a legal title to their land, and their policies of confiscation and 
concessions to European commercial interests led to a decline in industry within the 
country.31  These general policies are contrasted with the efforts of reformers who aimed 
to transform Iran, such as those who led the 1906 Constitutional Revolution or forward-
looking nineteenth century leaders, such as Mirza Taqi Khan, who served as prime 
minister from 1848 to 1851.  Their objectives offer insight to the understanding of 
modernity within the country.  Various individuals advocated or, in the case of those who 
occupied government posts, imposed changes to Iran's policies.  Mirza Taqi Khan, known 
as Amir Kabir, or Great Lord, in Iran, took steps that would be followed, almost a century 
later, by Reza Shah.  To protect national sovereignty, concessions to foreigners were 
opposed.  Centralization, as well, was a central element of the reform program.  This 
meant the establishment of a strong military under the command of the central 
government and administrative reforms designed to expand Tehran's power over the 
provinces.  At the same time, efforts were made to encourage education, public health, 
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and industrial development.  Ultimately, Amir Kabir's power and innovations attracted 
hostility from the traditional sector and the suspicion of the shah and he was removed 
from office and killed in 1851.32  Implicit in Ghods' presentation of reform efforts is that 
modernity can be defined in contrast to the Qajars.  Whereas the Qajars stood for 
backwardness, their successors were a force for modernization.   
 What problematizes this strategy is that, prior to introducing Reza Shah, Ghods 
presents the 1906 Constitutional Revolution as a product of reformist efforts.  In his 
analysis, reformers wanted more than just centralization, protection of sovereignty, and 
such, but a constitutional check on royal authoritarianism.33  This conceptualization 
makes Reza Shah stand apart.  He may have been a centralizing leader, bolstered the 
military, and worked to encourage educational and other reforms, but his dictatorial 
tendencies left him with little concern for representative bodies.  Far from representing 
the antithesis to Qajar excess, Reza may well be seen as what the Qajars might have been 
if only they had the power and will.  Ghods' concept of modernization under Reza Shah, 
therefore, cannot be framed in terms of it being an inversion of the policies of his 
predecessors.  How could Reza's authoritarianism be reconciled with the efforts of Iran's 
reformers? 
 The key to understanding Ghods' concept of modernity can be found in Men of 
Order, edited by Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher.  Generally, the editors' introduction, 
elaborates upon much of what has already been discussed in this section.  Modernization, 
they write, meant the importation of European rules, laws, and technologies, and the 
impetus to modernize came from the need for Middle Eastern states to defend 
                                                                                                                                                                             
31 Ibid., 14-15. 




themselves.  More importantly, they show how modernization efforts in Iran became 
intertwined with dictatorship.  Because modernization was a defensive strategy, it was 
carried out in the name of state survival, not the betterment of individuals, and 
championed by an intelligentsia "made up of bureaucrats and military officers who 
identified their own interests with those of the state."34  Moreover, the perpetual threat 
posed by Europe meant that it needed to be conducted as quickly as possible. Together, 
these factors led many members of the intelligentsia to see dictatorship as the political 
model best suited for rapid modernization.35    By the time Reza Shah began his rise to 
power, this belief had been reinforced by the perceived failure of the constitutional 
government.36  The importance of the foreign occupation of Iran during the Great War 
and its subsequent fragmentation cannot be overstated.  The virtual collapse of the state 
made Reza's leadership much more desirable and his faults more forgivable.   
 Atabaki and Zurcher make a point to remind readers that Reza Shah's policies 
were not the result of his devotion to a program offered by modernist thinkers.  On the 
contrary, he drew upon their ideas when they benefited him and would cast them aside 
when they did not.  Reza did not adhere to any type of broad theory or political 
movement.  Theories, movements, and their advocates existed only to be used as 
instruments in his state-building project. Individuals who fell out of the shah's favor faced 
serious consequences.  When the "modernist intellectuals," reformers who had initially 
supported the secularizing and centralizing mission of Reza Shah, discovered that they 
had been used as pawns, when his arbitrariness and brutality became undeniable, those 
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who had not been executed or intimidated into submission came to oppose him.37 
 Reza Shah's particular understanding of modernization is difficult to gauge.  As 
Amin Banani notes, Reza "left no political testament, which, taken as a whole, could be 
considered his program of the ideological core of his revolution."38  His actions suggest 
that he acted with "a perception of tradition" and "a particular conception of 
modernity."39  That he sought Western technology and military supplies while forcing 
Iranians to adopt Western clothing reveals that he had an eye turned to Europe, but might 
indicate that his knowledge of the Western world was not very deep.  He only knew that 
which he could see.  This could help to explain why a political party modeled after fascist 
groups in Europe, and designed to support him, was eventually dissolved by Reza Shah 
because it could, potentially, turn against him.40  It seems safest to say that the 
modernization of Iran under Reza Shah involved the adoption of Western industries and 
technologies, the creation of a centralized government with Western-styled systems of 
administration, and the Westernization of the population by mandating dress codes and 
by pursuing a policy of secularization.  All of this was done while championing Iranian 
nationalism, especially the grandeur of the pre-Islamic period.41  The goal of this project 
cannot be seen as the simple imitation of Europe, but the adaptation of European systems 
for the purpose of national renewal.  As Jeffrey Herf has written, "There is no such thing 
as modernity in general.  There are only national societies, each of which becomes 
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modern in its own fashion."42  The story of Iranian modernization, as carried out under 
Reza Shah, deals with the effort to move in the direction of the West while retaining a 
distinct national character, as well as the attempt to create a Western country where, 
previously, only a nominal state existed. 
  
Military Modernization 
 At the center of Reza Shah's modernization effort was the military.  To him, the 
creation of a modern army, above all else, was the only way to save the country from 
destruction.43  The modern military, however, was more than the guarantor of 
sovereignty.  Creating a unified force under the command of the central government was 
an unprecedented step in Iran's history.  By constructing garrisons throughout the 
country, the central government was able to assert its authority over the Iranian interior.  
Conscription allowed, not only for the expansion of the armed forces, but for the 
education and indoctrination of the population.  On a variety of levels, the development 
of the military was an exercise, not just in state-building, but nation-building as well.  In 
order to understand how the creation of a modern military contributed to Reza Shah's 
project, the concept of the "modern military" must first be examined. 
 David Ralston rejects the term "modernization" in favor of the more precise 
"Europeanization" when discussing the development of the military in non-Western 
states.  In Importing the European Army, he argues that there is no benchmark for 
modernity, just as there are no criteria to establish its superiority over the "nonmodern."  
The adoption of European inspired militaries opened the door, however unintentionally, 
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for the introduction of additional Western practices.44  Given the previous discussion of 
modernization in general, the usage of Europeanization or Westernization does not seem 
objectionable.  The modern army, therefore, is one patterned after those developed by 
Europe, specifically those "tailored to meet the resources of [a state], with the soldiers 
organized on a regular basis."45  Such a force requires several elements: financial support, 
trained personnel, an officer corps, an administrative apparatus, and, of course, 
weaponry.46  These features necessitate that, in order to field a modern, Westernized 
army on the battlefield, a state make institutional changes necessary to maintain it during 
peacetime.  For non-Europeans, this often meant making changes to domestic policies.47  
Amin Banani has observed that Reza Shah "instinctively understood the lesson of 
European history- the emergence of a unified national state coincides with the 
development of a standing national army."48  However "instinctively" he may have done 
so, in some fashion, Reza connected the military with nation and state building.  
 Creating and maintaining a modern army are expensive undertakings.  In order to 
extract the resources necessary to maintain a military force, those resources being 
manpower, materials, and money, rulers must rely upon coercion or persuasion to acquire 
them.  The coercive approach would be to requisition whatever resources were desired, 
even by force, if necessary.  In a state, such as Iran, where collecting taxes often required 
the threat of military force, this can lead to a cyclic pattern where more soldiers are 
desired in order to obtain more resources.  Alternatively, a ruler may rely upon 
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persuasion in cases where, whether for religious or nationalistic purposes, a population 
actually desires to provide resources to the military.  Samuel Finer writes that "[b]eliefs 
could inspire populations to sacrifices hitherto undreamt of," leading rulers to favor 
consensual donations over those gained by coercion.49  In either case, the need for regular 
and predictable supplies of resources led to the rise of bureaucracies designed to 
administer the internal affairs of countries.  Additionally, it led to legal reforms designed 
to stabilize society as "the more uniform and better disciplined a society was, the more 
easily it could be administered and the more predictable were the moneys it could 
produce."50 
 The process of creating the bureaucratic structures designed to procure the 
necessary resources needed by a military is linked to the projects of nation and state-
building.  State-building can be seen to involve what Samuel Finer has termed 
territoriality and function.  Territoriality is simply the assertion that a state is a bounded 
entity united under a single government.  Function refers to the individuals who serve in 
the government of a state, specifically whether they are members of the civil or military 
service.51  The bureaucratization process demonstrates both of these factors in action.  On 
one hand, the bureaucracy serves a single government presiding over a state, not a 
collection of fiefdoms.  It represents the ruling body that has monopolized power over a 
parcel of territory.  On the other hand, it highlights the functions of state agents as 
individuals who either defend it by the use of force or support it by playing a non-military 
role.  The more specialized a country's bureaucracy, the more efficiently it could perform 
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its tasks.52  Bureaucratized states can more effectively collect taxes or conduct 
consciption and play a greater role in the lives of ordinary citizens.53  The incorporation 
of new technologies, the telegraph or radio, further streamlines this process. 
 To draw upon Finer's thought again, nation-building occurs when a state's 
population identifies itself as a national community and "its members mutually distribute 
and share duties and benefits."54  By fostering a sense of nationhood via the promulgation 
of nationalism, a government could simplify its pursuit of resources.  The power of 
nationalism is that a population will sacrifice resources without the threat of coercion.55  
Individuals will give up money, time, or their very lives for the good of their national 
community.  Through persuasion where a sense of nationalism is forged, a state's power 
to extract resources becomes virtually unlimited.56   
 The need for trained soldiers, officers, and bureaucrats also requires the intrusion 
of the state into non-military matters.  As units became more specialized and weapons 
more complex, the training of individual soldiers, including the instillation of a sense of 
discipline, became more important.57  The potentiality for conscription meant that all 
young men were prospective soldiers, thus, all needed to be prepared for military service 
should the need arise.  Even in the absence of compulsory service, the favor shown to the 
persuasive factor of nationalism made it desirable for youths to be indoctrinated with a 
fair amount of nationalism.  Education, the state-operated school, can be seen to 
introduce children to military order.  There they are taught the prevalent ideology of the 
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state and, depending upon ability, for a particular role within it.58  Similarly, as fighting 
units grew smaller and more dependent upon the command of officers, the 
professionalism of those officers became a major concern.  The increasingly complex 
nature of their responsibilities required that they be the recipients both of general 
education and specialized training for their military role.59  In order to administer the 
state, oversee the maintenance of the military, and develop new technologies for military 
application, states need trained bureaucrats.  Throughout Europe, schools were 
constructed with the explicit purpose of training experts to performs functions that 
supported the military.  As Ralston concludes, "[b]y its very existence, by the demands it 
created and the social pressures it caused, the standing army was one of the major forces 
behind almost every revolutionary transformation of European society between 1500 and 
1700."60  A non-European state that wished to create a Westernized military force would 
have to make similar changes to its domestic arrangements, whether it intended to or not.  
 
Iran, 1890-1941: An Overview 
 What follows here is a brief chronological summary of the major events that 
shaped Iran's history in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.61  The 1890's 
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stand out as a defining moment in Iranian history.  The Qajar dynasty presided over an 
Iranian state that was in distress.  Britain and Russia used the country as a pawn in their 
political battle with one another while the shahs were, seemingly, powerless to remove 
foreign influence.  The Iranian people were impoverished, subject to the whims of 
arbitrary and autocratic rulers, and increasingly aware of their vulnerable position in the 
world.  During the final decade of the nineteenth century, the Qajar shahs became 
increasingly unpopular, in part due to the economic concessions doled out to Europeans.  
In 1890, Iran's ruler, Naser al-Din Shah, granted a monopoly over the tobacco trade to a 
British company.  This generated considerable resistance and sparked the cooperation of 
a wide array of Iranians who, in spite of their differences, were willing to work together 
for a common purpose, in this case, the cancellation of the tobacco concession.  A 
boycott of tobacco products began in December 1891 and, after demonstrations against 
the concession grew so large that they had to be bloodily dispersed, the shah relented and 
rescinded the monopoly early the next year.  It was to be a harbinger of things to come, 
an example of the population rising up against the decaying Qajar dynasty.  The three 
primary groups whose efforts helped to drive the protests, the merchant middle class, the 
clergy, and the nascent Western educated intellectual elite, will be discussed further 
below.   
 In spite of the protests, the Qajar shahs continued to antagonize their subjects 
through repression and misguided economic policies.  These steps further alienated the 
developing intelligentsia, took money out of the hands of the merchants, and, by 
extension, deprived the clergy of their expected tithes.  A series of demonstrations against 
the government's response to an economic and agricultural crisis in 1905 became 
                                                                                                                                                                             




increasingly intense and, by 1906, had grown into a revolution.  This conflict, which 
would eventually become known as the Constitutional Revolution, pitted the Qajar shah 
and his supporters against the proponents of constitutional rule.  The latter included the 
aforementioned alliance of clergy, merchants, and intellectuals.  Iran's intelligentsia was 
instrumental in pushing forth the idea of constitutionalism as a check on royal power.  In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a small number of Iranians attended 
European mission schools or traveled to Europe for education.  These individuals were 
imbued with a knowledge of Western political concepts and were eager to apply them at 
home.  During the late Qajar period and into Reza's rule, this small yet educated and 
energetic class was a driving force behind most reform efforts.  
 Although the government responded to the uprising violently, the continued 
unrest, and threat of it spreading, forced the shah to approve the creation of a national 
assembly in 1906.  Even with the creation of this body, the constitutionalists and 
monarchists continued to vie for political power.  In 1908, the shah used loyal military 
units to forcibly close the majlis, Iran's parliament, and tried to round up, imprison, and 
execute as many of his opponents as possible.  Tabriz became the locus of resistance and, 
after surviving a siege, constitutionalist leaders there linked up with their allies to 
advance on Tehran.  The shah abdicated, in 1909, in favor of his young son and fled with 
the assistance of the Russians.  Even with their success in overcoming monarchist 
opposition, Iran's constitutionalist leaders came from such disparate backgrounds that 
they found it difficult to work together without a common foe.  The country remained 
decentralized and, after the majlis refused a Russian demand that an American financial 




majlis was dissolved, not to be reconvened until 1914, and the revolutionary period came 
to a close. 
 Beginning in 1911, Iran was occupied by British and Russian forces.  There were 
numerous protests against foreign occupation, several of them bloody, but the Europeans 
remained in control.  During the Great War, Iran remained, officially, neutral, but was not 
spared violence.  Ottoman soldiers invaded the northern part of the country while German 
agents incited tribal insurrections against the occupying British and Russian armies.  In 
response, Britain recruited its own military unit and found tribal allies to protect its 
interests in the country.  Nationalist leaders, emboldened by German and Ottoman 
successes in Europe, fought against the British, the Russians, and their allies.  By 1916, 
the most prominent resistance group, the Government of National Defense, had been 
crushed by Britain and its allies, but other factions continued to fight elsewhere in the 
country.  When, in 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution caused the retreat of Russia's armies, 
British troops expanded northward to fill the void.   
 Through it all, the Qajar leaders in Tehran appeared absolutely unable to either 
protect Iranian sovereignty or to assert authority over the country's interior.  Russian and 
Ottoman soldiers were withdrawn from the country with the end of the war in 1918, but 
the British were entrenched more firmly, politically and geographically, than ever before.  
Iran's central government held no power beyond Tehran, leaving virtually all of the 
country under tribal control or British occupation.  Worse still for the Qajars, their close 
ties with Britain, however coerced they might have been, infuriated the nationalist groups 
in the country that were still under arms.  One of these, Kuchik Khan's Jangalis, which 




early 1920 to help fight the British armies advancing on northern Iran.  With the country 
fragmenting among tribes and factions, militarily occupied by foreigners, and under a 
government whose power was virtually nonexistent, many Iranians hoped for the 
emergence of a strong leader to reverse the country's decline.  What they got was a 
Cossack Colonel named Reza Khan, an ambitious and opportunistic character whose 
policies would, better or worse, transform Iran forever. 
 In February 1921, Reza led a contingent of Persian Cossacks to Tehran and 
arrested dozens of political leaders.  He stated that his intent was to save the Qajar 
monarchy, to end foreign occupation, and to stop the disintegration of the country.  The 
Qajar shah granted Reza the position of Army Commander and named his co-conspirator, 
Sayyid Zia Tabatabai, prime minister.  Almost immediately, the new government went to 
work.  A treaty was signed with the Soviets exchanging their withdrawal from northern 
Iran for a guarantee that the country would not be used to attack the Soviet Union.  
Additionally, a 1919 treaty with Britain was cancelled and social reforms were declared.  
The partnership between Reza and Tabatabai was to be short lived, however, as the two 
held major differences in opinion regarding key issues, particularly the matter of British 
advisors to the Iranian military.  Tabatabai wanted Britain's assistance, Reza, seeking an 
all-Iranian force, did not.  In May, 1921, Sayyid Zia was forced out of office.   
 Once his former partner was out of the way, Reza expanded his power over the 
new government, specifically the War Ministry, and used a combination of armed force 
and political maneuvering to eliminate the rebel groups that had plagued the Qajars since 
the Great War.  Military victories enhanced Reza's prestige, as did the political alliances 




American financial advisor Arthur Chester Millspaugh who, between 1922 and 1927, led 
a team tasked with organizing Iran's budget.  In order to collect taxes, Millspaugh had to 
rely upon military force.  Increased revenue allowed for further expansion of the military, 
and the larger military served to expand the power of the central government.  Moreover, 
Iran's armed forces were consolidated into a single army under Reza's command.  In 
1923, Reza assumed the office of prime minister and became Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces two years later.  The Qajar shah, who had journeyed to Europe in 1923 for 
alleged medical purposes, was powerless to stop Reza's consolidation of power.  In 1925, 
after briefly floating the possibility of implementing a republican form of government, 
Reza oversaw a vote that decided to abolish the Qajar dynasty and offer him the throne.  
Reza Khan had become Reza Shah Pahlavi. 
 With his rise to power complete, Reza Shah dedicated himself to modernizing 
Iran, meaning the Westernization process described above.  Having been a soldier 
himself, Reza placed the military at the center of his effort, and its development also 
pushed the government to create Western institutions.  The Iranian army grew into a vast 
conscript force and proudly displayed its expensive new weapons at public parades.  
More than ten thousand miles of new roads and over a thousand miles of railroad were 
constructed in order to facilitate the movement of men and material around the country.62  
As the power of the central government in Tehran grew, Iran's tribes became increasingly 
subject to state domination.  By the early 1930's, Reza's control over the country's interior 
was certain.  The country was pacified at gunpoint.  In addition to purely military 
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pursuits, Reza Shah embarked upon an ambitious building campaign, constructing a 
number of new schools, hospitals, and factories.  Even Iranians themselves were made to 
change, as traditional modes of dress were abolished and men and women were forced to 
abide by new national dress codes.  Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, Reza Shah courted 
foreign powers to assist him in his efforts.  He acquired arms and technological assistance 
from various European states, including Italy, Czechoslovakia, France, Britain, and 
Germany.  Beyond looking to Europe, he sought to draw the United States into Iranian 
affairs in order to offset British and Soviet influence.   
 Of his numerous European engagements, his ties to Germany would prove most 
consequential.  By the late 1930's, Germany had become Iran's premier trading partner.  
This undeniable link, along with Reza's apparent affinity for Europe's fascists63, paired 
with the politics of World War II to doom Reza Shah's rule.  Germany's success in 
Europe and seemingly unstoppable advance into the Soviet Union led to a marriage of 
convenience between Britain and the Soviets.  Iran's geographical position and oil 
resources made it critical to the Allied war effort.  War materials bound for the Soviet 
Union could be shipped through Iran year round, thanks to its warm water ports.  The 
country also served as a natural barrier between British India and a possible German 
advance through the Middle East.  Because of Reza Shah's recalcitrance, his refusal to 
accede to Allied demands to expel German nationals and allow the passage of war 
materials through the country, a joint British and Russian force invaded Iran on August 
25, 1941.  The operation was a total success for the Allies and an unmitigated disaster for 
the Iranians.  Reza Shah abdicated on September 16, 1941.  He was taken into custody by 
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the British and moved, eventually, to South Africa, where he died on July 26, 1944. 
 The above overview of Iranian history illustrates the broad trajectory of the 
country during a crucial period of transformation that lasted half a century.  In the most 
general terms, Iran moved politically from being ruled by an autocrat with limited 
authority to being ruled by an autocrat with unchecked authority.  This is, of course, an 
egregious oversimplification.  A crucial development, perhaps the development, that 
opened the door for Reza Shah to take power was the emergence of nationalism in Iran.  
With a basic chronology of events in Iran established, this study will now seek to present 
the origins and tenets of Iranian nationalism, as well as to uncover varying strains of it 




II.  Rousing the Slumbering Lion:  Proponents and Opponents of Modernization in 
Iran 
  
The Iranian State in 1921: A Snapshot 
  Iran, as it existed in 1921, posed significant challenges to the centralizing and 
modernizing ambitions of any reformer.  The size and topography of the country, as well 
as its climate, when combined with a dearth of traversable roadways, made it difficult to 
control from the center.  The heterogeneity of its population in terms of ethnicity or tribal 
affiliation exacerbated the problem of command.  Compounding this further was the 
general underdevelopment of the country.  With few reliable roads in place, the 
government had little influence beyond Tehran.  Much of the country had little 
interaction with the state at all, let alone on a regular basis.  This lack of authority made 
the extraction of resources, primarily tax revenue, quite problematic.  Imposing order on 
such a place, and with limited means, was not to be an easy task. 
 Because of its climate and geography, Iran has often been compared to a natural 
fortress.64  Its land area of 628,000 square miles makes it the 17th largest country on 
earth.  This means it is larger than the combined territories of France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, virtually all of Western Europe.  To contrast 
Iran with its neighbors, it is 68 percent larger than Iraq and Afghanistan combined.65  The 
sheer size of the country is made even more problematic by its topography.  Mountains 
ring the country on all sides, and even run parallel with its southern coast.  These ranges 
act as a natural barrier between Iran and its neighbors, and leave the country "ill-suited to 
maneuver warfare, whether conducted by ancient armies or modern armored and 
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mechanized ground forces."66  Transportation difficulties created by the presence of Iran's 
mountains were made more difficult by the lack of navigable waterways.  As a result, the 
population of the country was broken up into a multitude of small, isolated villages.  
Even by the 1950's, when the country's population was nearly twenty million, the mean 
size of a village was approximately 250 people.67  One of the few peripheral areas 
without mountains is a plain in the southwestern corner of the country, along its southern 
border with Iraq.  Even here, the ground is swampy and poses challenges to 
transportation.  If its mountains act as natural walls, the swamps of southwestern Iran 
serve as a moat.  The center of the country, inside the mountainous ring, is made up of 
two large deserts.  The northernmost, called the Dasht-e Kavir, is known for having a 
salty crust that covers a layer of thick mud.  It is entirely possible for an individual to 
break through the surface, fall into the mud, and drown in the middle of the desert.68  
Further north, along the Caspian coast, the region is made up of dense, almost 
impenetrable forests interspersed with swamps.69  It is almost as though the forces of 
nature conspired to make the country's geography as challenging as possible. 
 The rugged terrain of Iran is matched with an inhospitable climate.  Half of the 
country's territory receives less than ten inches of rain per year.70  When rain does fall, 
the tall mountains and narrow valleys make flooding a problem.  This is often the case in 
verdant region of northern Iran, where dense fog also works to hinder travel.  Generally, 
the country is arid, and this dryness allows for the presence of significant amounts of dust 
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in the atmosphere.  At times, the air is so full of dust particles that visibility is negatively 
impacted, a condition known as a "brownout."  Dust storms, which can be severe enough 
to impact military operations by damaging weapons and equipment, are also a common 
occurrence.  Most pervasive, however, is the excessive heat of Iran's summers.  In some 
areas of the country, this can mean daytime temperatures of more than 120 degrees 
Fahrenheit.  Even the healthiest individuals can be physically active only for a short time 
in such oppressive heat, and the dryness of the country makes access to water that much 
more important.71 
 In 1921, Iran's population was estimated at between eight and ten million people.  
Around three million of those were believed to be nomadic, including an Arab population 
of more than 250,000, almost 725,000 Turks, and more than 650,000 Kurds.  Owing to 
the lack of an official census at this time, exact numbers are unknown.72  In any case, 
estimates suggest that the tribal contingent formed a significant percentage of the 
population, perhaps more than a third and likely no less than fifteen percent in 1920.73  
The presence of these sizable, often non-Persian speaking, minority groups posed a 
challenge to nationalist leaders who sought to impose uniformity on the population, 
particularly the Persian chauvinism endorsed by many nationalist leaders at the time.74  
Accustomed to their autonomy, Iran’s tribal population resisted the central government’s 
efforts to expand its authority.  Their goal was to protect their way of life and their 
independence from the government officials who viewed them as a symptom of Iran’s 
weakness.   
                                                           
71 Ward, Immortal, 7-9. 
72 Scott-Keltie, The Statesman's Year-Book, 58th Edition, 1164-1165. 
73 Banani, The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941, 29. 




 A 1921 list of Iran's major cities and their supposed populations provides more 
insight as to the state of the country.  Even the most generous figures of the fourteen 
principal cities of the country, when added together, amount to just over one million 
people.75  The overwhelming majority of the country's inhabitants were rural.  Moreover, 
Iranians have been characterized as "mountain dwellers" due to the inhospitable climate 
and geography of the lowlands.76  Most of Iran's citizens were, not just far removed from 
urban centers, but dispersed into virtually self-sufficient, isolated communities scattered 
throughout the country.77 
 The far-flung villages and citizens of Iran were bound together by only the most 
rudimentary transportation infrastructure.  In 1921, there were just 150 miles of railroad 
in the entire country.78  The utter inadequacy of this amount is obvious when compared to 
the 30,000 miles of track that the United States possessed in 1861.79  Until 1903, little 
more than 300 miles of "carriageable" road existed.80  Additional roads were constructed 
in the first decades of the twentieth century, but there were still fewer than 2,000 miles of 
roadway in 1925, and much of it was in poor condition.81  Many of these were 
constructed by Russian and British companies that were often permitted to charge 
travelers tolls.82  The weak central government was unable to secure the few roads that 
existed, making any sort of travel fraught with the threat of attack by bandits or unruly 
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tribesmen.83  The difficulty of movement and mortal peril involved with it only served to 
further isolate remote settlements. 
 The weakness of Iran's central government complicated matters of geography and 
demographics.  Financially, the country was in dire straits in 1921.  The most reliable 
method of acquiring revenue was through a tariff on imports.  This was, in no small part, 
because the collection of tariffs was conducted by Belgian officials, professionals, rather 
than poorly trained or corrupt local officials.  Tariff duties, however, were not determined 
by the will or needs of Iran's government, but by treaties that it had been forced to sign 
with Europeans.  Collecting taxes was problematic due to the political clout of powerful 
landowners and corrupt officials.  Those with the means to do so avoided paying taxes as 
much as possible, while collectors routinely siphoned off funds intended for the 
government.84  As a result, the bulk of the tax burden fell upon the laboring classes.  To 
make matters worse, the country had enormous debts in the form of loans from Russia 
and Britain and was behind on payments for most of them.85  Income from oil amounted 
to approximately £600,000, a mere fraction of what it would eventually reach.86  The 
government simply did not have the ability to efficiently extract revenue from the 
population on a consistent basis. 
 Education in Iran was also troubled.  In 1920, there were just 10,000 students 
attending roughly 180 non-religious schools nationwide.87  Even when religious 
institutions, called maktabs or medressehs, are considered, enrollment climbs only to 
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50,000.88  Around 50 students were enrolled in a special college designed to train 
diplomatic officers.  For the most part, higher education was achieved under European 
tutelage.  Medical, language, and science oriented institutions were staffed by instructors 
recruited from Europe.89  Iran simply did not have the trained personnel to operate a 
modern educational system.  Given that the only criteria necessary to serve as a teacher 
were to be at least twenty years old and to show good conduct, and since most Iranians, if 
they had received any education at all, received minimal instruction in the fields of 
religion and language, the dearth of indigenous experts is understandable.90  Women's 
education, which had made advances in the early twentieth century, remained 
undeveloped due to clerical and popular opposition.91 
 Industrialization, essentially, had not taken place.  The few factories that existed, 
including a sugar refinery and match factory, were inoperable due to lack of maintenance 
or their not being profitable in the face of cheap imported goods.92  Even by 1925, there 
were less than 20 modern plants, and only 5 employed more than fifty workers.  
Nationally, fewer than 1,000 people were employed in modern factories.93  The legendary 
Persian carpets of the country were manufactured by hand, and virtually all other exports 
were either agricultural products or raw materials.  Iran possessed an abundance of 
mineral wealth, but this was similarly underdeveloped.94  In all likelihood, the lack of 
industrial development was a product the logistical difficulties posed by the combination 
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of Iran's topography and inadequate transportation network.  It was simply impossible to 
make the widespread construction of factories profitable given the challenges of moving 
raw materials and finished products to and from locations around the country.   
 The underdeveloped state of Iran took its toll on the population.  Only in the early 
twentieth century did the government begin to concern itself with the issue of public 
health.  Prior to this, the only hospital facilities in the country were operated by European 
and American missionaries.  The government's early efforts to promote public health, 
such as attempts to encourage vaccination, taxes on opium, or establishing credentials for 
medical professionals, amounted to little.  In 1922, 4,287 deaths were recorded in Tehran.  
Only 30 of these, less than one percent, were attributable to old age.  A year later, this 
could be said for 41 out of 4,588 deaths.  1,113 of the dead, roughly a quarter of the total 
number, were infants less than a year old.95  By comparison, there were 11,944 deaths in 
Sheffield, England between 1837 and 1842.  1,146 during this period, nearly a tenth, 
were attributed to "decline" or "decay of nature," presumably euphemisms for old age.  
Infants less than a year old numbered 2,983, or one quarter of the total amount.96  In 
terms of infant mortality, early twentieth century Tehran was comparable to England 
during the Industrial Revolution.  Where they differed was that, in spite of the perils of 
factory life, a person born in England was more likely to survive to old age than a citizen 
of Tehran.  While statistics for rural Iran are not available, they are not likely to have 
been any better.  In 1924, 323 of the country's 905 physicians practiced in Tehran for a 
ratio of one doctor to every 680 people.  This left 582 doctors for the remainder of the 
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country, a ratio of one to 16,800.97 
 When Reza Shah began his rise in 1921, the odds were stacked against him.  In 
terms of climate and geography, the country was rugged and inhospitable.  The 
population was diverse and fractious, with communities independent by virtue of their 
physical isolation, and aided in defense of their independence by the natural fortifications 
afforded by high mountain walls and narrow passes.  Without reliable roads to facilitate 
troop movements, the Tehran government faced difficulty simply moving forces from 
place to place.  Resources were scarce.  The country's leaders were in no financial 
position to maintain a large army, and the complete lack of an industrial base forced them 
to look abroad for war materials.  Iranians, themselves, were ill-equipped to bring about 
the type of radical transformation that Reza and other reformers had in mind.  Most were 
virtually uneducated, essentially illiterate, with little or no connection to the nuances of 
European notions of modernity.  Beyond this, they were unhealthy and impoverished, 
fortunate to survive childhood and unlikely to reach old age.  It was from this situation, a 
veritable debacle among nations, that Reza hoped to build a modern and cohesive state.  
When viewed along these lines, what he managed to accomplish is truly remarkable. 
 
The Iranian Ideological Milieu 
 The genesis of Iranian nationalism predates the Constitutional Revolution, lasting 
from 1906 to 1911, with which it eventually became intertwined.  As was mentioned 
briefly above, throughout the nineteenth century, Western economic and educational 
penetration of Iran permanently and fatally altered the relationship between the Qajar 
dynasts and Iranian society.  In response to the threat posed by European commerce, 
                                                           




historically dispersed bazaar merchants began to recognize themselves to possess 
common interests and later became known as the traditional middle class or bazaaris.  
Historically, the bazaaris had close ties to the ulama, the Shi'i clergy, who opposed 
Western influences and saw the shah as a rival for power.98  Clerical power stemmed 
from the fact that most Iranians were Shi'i and religious leaders of that sect were often 
viewed as models of righteous behavior, were seen as qualified to interpret religious law 
and doctrine, and were supported by compulsory religious tithes.99   They also found an 
unlikely ally in a newly emerged social class, the modern intelligentsia.  These 
individuals, though few in number, were the recipients of a secular, Western education, 
either in Europe or through European and American mission schools, and spoke of the 
benefits of Western ideas, such as liberalism, nationalism, and even socialism.100  
Members of this developing class left their mark on the Persian language as well, by 
introducing new words using Western terms like, despot, parleman, demokrat, and by 
reinterpreting old words to fit new concepts, such as equating the old word for monarchy 
with the new connotation of "despotic monarchy," or transforming mardom, people, into 
a value-laden expression of "the People."101 
 The spread of both bazaari sentiment and the ideas of the budding intelligentsia 
were no doubt facilitated by the commercial endeavors of foreigners, such as the 
construction of roads and telegraph lines.102  Furthermore, the presence of these foreign 
agents and their activities spoke to the grievances of Iran's aforementioned groups.  Their 
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economic ventures threatened the welfare of the bazaaris, and the concessions made to 
them offended the intelligentsia.  Events beyond Iran's borders also worked to spread 
these new ideas.  News of the Russo-Japanese War, the first example of a Western state 
meeting defeat at the hands of a non-European power, and the subsequent Russian 
Revolution of 1905 created an atmosphere in which liberal and patriotic concepts could 
find traction.103 The cooperation between the bazaaris and intelligentsia, the traditional 
and the modern, in opposing the Qajar grant of an 1890 monopoly on tobacco to a British 
company represented the beginnings of a partnership that would ultimately pave the way 
for the rise of Reza Shah.104  It was an ungainly alliance between two groups whose 
noticeably different interests coalesced when it came to opposing foreign intrusion and 
the corruption of the reigning dynasty.  
 Iranian nationalism is closely linked with constitutionalism because they appeared 
at the forefront of the political scene at the same time.  It was, after all, during the early 
days of the revolution that the phrase "nation of Iran" was first shouted on the streets of 
Tehran.105  Even a brief survey of scholarship dealing with the period reveals that there is 
a general tendency to use the terms "nationalist" and "constitutionalist" interchangeably 
or, at the least, to bind them together so tightly that one would assume that they refer to 
the same phenomenon.106  This is not the case.  Constitutionalism refers to a broader 
reform movement of which nationalists were an enthusiastic participant.  Not all 
constitutionalists were nationalists.  There were clear differences between the latter and 
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the traditional element of the former, those who, would now be considered Islamist, that 
will be discussed below.  For the sake of clarity, this study will use the term "reformer" 
when speaking generally of the advocates of the constitutional movement.   
 What these reformers believed must first be considered.  In their ideology there 
were both foreign and domestic components, and their objectives were contradictory.  An 
overarching theme was the resentment of Western encroachment while pursuing a policy 
of Westernization and equating it with modernity.107  Iranian reformers, in general, 
sought to strengthen the country through a particular type of political modernization, 
specifically the centralization of the government around a parliamentary body.  Although 
the past glories of the Persian Empire were a part of Iranian nationalist mythology, many 
of the trappings of traditionalism were no longer desirable.  The nomadic way of life 
practiced by many tribal groups and unrestrained absolutist monarchy were seen to have 
no place in the country's future.108  The Fundamental Laws, one of the earliest acts of the 
Iranian majlis, or parliament, were passed in December 1906 and stripped the shah of his 
power to make treaties or concessions, take out loans, or adjust the budget.109  Beginning 
with the commercial capitulations of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, the 
Middle East had become increasingly economically subservient to Europe, which brought 
with it the granting of special rights and privileges to non-Muslim Europeans in the area.  
Moreover, economic domination opened the door for outright intervention, as was the 
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case in Egypt in 1882.110  In the Iranian context, the Qajar shahs demonstrated a penchant 
for using loans and concession revenue to finance their excessive and opulent lifestyles 
while the majority of the country languished in abject poverty.  One shah, in 1896, 
borrowed the equivalent of twelve million dollars from Russia in order to take a vacation 
to Europe.111  That the Fundamental Laws tackled the fiscal irresponsibility of the 
monarchy directly cannot be unexpected.  It is evident in that these provisions were 
simultaneously anti-monarchial and anti-colonial, revealing the broader theme of 
curtailing traditional "backwardness" while eliminating foreign influences.   
 These ideas appealed to the modern intelligentsia, those typically referred to as 
nationalists, but they comprised but a small portion of the Iranian population.  Iranian 
nationalism can be separated from the wider constitutionalist movement along these 
grounds.  Nationalist ideology sought more than Westernization in the material or 
political sense.  Many nationalists, regardless of their own religious views, were 
vehemently anti-clerical.  These individuals saw the clergy, not only as enemies of 
reform and progress, but as intellectually incapable of handling modern affairs not 
explicitly mentioned in the Quran.  In order to undermine clerical influence and allow for 
the success of future reforms, Islamic tradition, venerable as it was, would need to be 
replaced in the public sphere by modern secularism.112  The outwardly anti-religious bent 
had little appeal to a great many of their allies among the bazaaris and Shi'i clergy, the 
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ulama.  In fact, many leading clergymen opposed the constitutional reforms and sided 
with the Qajar shahs, labeling constitutionalism as a heresy.113  American observers in 
Iran, even if sympathetic toward the reformers' struggle, were skeptical at the prospects 
for their success in a country with a largely illiterate population and no heritage of non-
autocratic government.  In late 1906, the American ambassador, Richmond Pearson, 
wrote from Tehran that he and his colleagues expected that "nothing substantial and 
permanent will grow out of this sudden movement for reform."114  Several provisions in 
the Supplementary Fundamental Laws (1907) attest to the compromises made to 
traditionalist interests, notably the declaration of Shi'ism as the official religion, 
prohibition of religious minorities from serving as government ministers, and grant of 
veto power to the ulama over any laws deemed irreconcilable with the principles of 
Islam.115  Such compromises, however, could not solve the problems of the underlying 
ideological divide within the heterogeneous coalition whose combined efforts were 
necessary for the success of the new government. 
 Even within the ranks of Iran's nationalists, there was no single, universally 
accepted, doctrine.  They were united, broadly, behind a concept of national revival, but 
as one historian says, "differences in detail prevented a workable and durable 
synthesis."116  Among the ranks of Iran's nationalists were the anticlerical secularists, 
those who held Islam responsible, to some degree, for the country's woes.  Their radical 
stance forced them to tone down their rhetoric in order to draw upon the multitude of 
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Iranians that the ulama could mobilize.  Less numerous were those who attempted to 
reconcile Islamic belief with Western ideas, and whose goals were often shared with 
reformers in the clergy.117  Between their limited numbers and internal divisions, the 
nationalists were essentially powerless to effect real political change.  More importantly, 
nationalist mythology remained confined, largely, to the realm of elite culture, while the 
majority of the population remained under the sway of the ulama and Islamic 
symbolism.118 
 If Iran was anything prior to Reza's emergence in the 1920's, it was a state 
divided.  Proponents of constitutionalism were not only divorced from supporters of the 
Qajar monarchy, but were also split into rival parties.119  Different political factions had 
their own allies, and the various tribal groups were affiliated with both Iranian and 
foreign patrons.120  The failure of the constitutionalist program to create the desired 
centralized state and the headway it made in destroying the old political order left an 
undeniable vacuum where some manner of political authority should have existed.121  
Between the revolution and Reza's rise, Iran was subject to invasion and occupation by 
British, Russian, and Ottoman forces during the Great War, even though the country 
remained, officially, neutral.  What nominal central authority that existed was further 
eroded as national leaders allied themselves with or fought against foreign powers, 
accelerating the political disintegration of Qajar Iran.  Governments rose and fell, 
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oscillated between supporting the Entente or Central powers, and some nationalist leaders 
went so far as to establish a separate government in exile.  Even the Armistice failed to 
bring about order.  The ineffectual Qajar rulers were powerless to remove British troops 
from their soil, and the vast countryside was left under the control of any number of tribal 
or rebellious groups who were essentially unchecked by the Tehran government.122  It 
was this void, and the awareness of it by most Iranians, that allowed Reza Shah to step in 
with the general approval of the population. 
 At first thought, it may seem odd that a Cossack officer, a representative of the 
force that had been commanded by Russian officers until 1917 and attached to the Qajar 
shahs, would become a champion of Iranian nationalism.  Reza's alleged words could 
account for this, explaining his skepticism toward foreign powers: "I saw the destinies of 
Iran's forces determined by Russian officers, who intervened directly in all the affairs of 
the army and compelled the Iranian officers to accept their dictatorial ways."123  In any 
event, what is important is how Reza Shah co-opted preexisting nationalist sentiment and 
reconciled it with his own program.  If earlier nationalism was interested in 
constitutionalism and representative government, Reza Shah's brand of nationalism was 
concerned, ultimately, with advancing the interests of the Pahlavi dynasty.124  This is not 
to say that he acted primarily with his own benefit in mind, though some scholars point to 
his vast landholdings and fortune deposited in banks as though they are out of character 
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for a political figure and insist that this is the case.125  More accurately, he likely equated 
a stable executive with a stable state, a logical assumption if one considers the merits of 
Qajar rule.  That he, a ruler with unchecked power, sought to enrich himself financially 
can hardly be considered a surprise.  It would be more remarkable if he did not. 
 In general, Reza Shah offered a vision acceptable to nationalists and many other 
segments of the population when he stepped onto the political stage in 1921.  From the 
onset of the coup that eventually propelled him to power, he had stated that his primary 
objective was the establishment of a strong central government.  He professed loyalty to 
the shah but was hostile to the court advisors, whom he blamed for the decay of the 
country.126  This alleged loyalty would change a few years later when the opportunity to 
seize the throne presented itself, but it can hardly be seen as a critical point of departure.  
There is a difference, however, between an individual working with others to overthrow a 
government and an individual working to gain a position of power.  In his climb from 
Cossack to shah, and even after taking the throne, Reza forged and broke political 
alliances with Iran's various factions.   
 The first of these partnerships was with the Reformers' party (Hizb-i Eslah 
Taleban), which was, in spite of its name, dominated by conservatives, namely landed 
aristocrats, merchants, and the ulama.127  Thanks to a law that introduced universal male 
suffrage, the Reformers could draw upon a vast pool of votes from Iran's traditional 
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sector, the countryside.128  By allying with the majority party, Reza was able to expand 
his power and appeal.  The ulama and their followers approved of his public appearance 
at and participation in a religious festival.129  In exchange for catering to the concerns of 
the conservatives, such as releasing several of their supporters from prison or supporting 
their political ambitions, Reza was rewarded with more power, a larger budget for the 
military, and declarations of martial law in tribal areas.  This marriage of convenience 
was shattered, however, when Reza pushed for conscription.  The landed aristocrats were 
not thrilled at the prospect of their pool of labor being diminished, and the ulama were 
aghast at the thought of young men being confined to a state institution and indoctrinated 
with secularism.130  Still, Reza's accomplishments, even in this early phase, were 
substantial enough to catch the attention of the international community.  An American 
newspaper cited the removal of Russian soldiers from Iran, the quelling of domestic 
rebellions, and the increasing prestige of the army, and attributed them all to the work of 
"one man."131 
 Undeterred, Reza aligned himself, next, in 1924, in a coalition that included the 
Revival party (Hizb-i Tajadod), dominated by genuine reformists, typically Westernized 
intellectuals, and the more radical Socialist party (Hizb-i Sosiyalist).  This combination 
marked the resurgence of nationalism in Iran.132  More importantly, it allowed Reza to 
begin his reshaping of the country.  His early dealings with the Reformist party were 
simply a means to an end, that of securing his own authority.  The most dangerous 
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opponents he faced, in his opinion, were the clerics.133  Both parties advocated 
Westernization and modernization, including the adoption of a secular, Western model of 
education.134  In order to make the new partnership a majority in the majlis, Reza used his 
strengthening military, the control of which had been bestowed upon him by his former 
conservative allies, to manipulate the elections in tribal areas.135  For the nationalists, this 
must have been a critical moment.  After having argued that the state could only succeed 
with a strong, centralized military, to then be given the opportunity to promote their 
agenda with the assistance of the military must have vindicated their beliefs.  Once in 
place, the new nationalist majority began to implement the reforms they felt necessary to 
transform Iran from a backwater to a modern state.136 
 It was during this time period that Reza moved to eliminate the Qajar dynasty.  In 
the spring of 1924, Iran's nationalists, influenced by developments in Turkey, lobbied for 
the creation of a republic.137  Worth noting, and that will be discussed below, is that not 
all of Iran's nationalists supported this effort, equating it with a dictatorship under Reza.  
Naturally, it was also opposed by the ulama and the traditional elements of Iranian 
society.  Much of this animosity stemmed from the abolition of the Caliphate in 
neighboring Turkey around the same time that a republic was proclaimed.  To many, 
"republic" was synonymous with "godless secularism."138  Protests soon broke out 
decrying the innovation of republican government.  In a backroom deal, Reza agreed to 
speak out against republicanism and in favor of constitutional monarchy, while 
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conservatives agreed to turn against the Qajar shah.  Shortly thereafter, in 1925, the 
Revival and Reformist parties passed a bill to abolish the Qajar dynasty and leave the 
state, temporarily, in the hands of Reza.  In another example of quid pro quo, Reza 
immediately repaid his conservative allies by banning the sale of alcohol and outlawing 
gambling, along with several other provisions.  When the time came to select a new shah, 
there could hardly be any doubt where the electors would turn.  Out of two-hundred sixty 
votes, only three did not support the creation of the Pahlavi dynasty.139  The reigns of 
power were firmly in the hands of Reza Shah.   
 The parties and allies that Reza used to bring himself to power were soon cast 
aside.  In 1927, he crushed the Communist (Tudeh) and Socialist parties and imprisoned 
many of their leaders, eliminating the conservative Revival party soon after.  By 1932, 
even the unflinchingly loyal Progress Party, which had gone through several incarnations 
and had become known as the Progressive Party (Hizb-i Taraqqi), was banned due to the 
shah's concern that it could become a source of opposition.140  Independent newspapers 
and labor unions were suppressed in 1927 as Reza relied more and more upon the state 
security apparatus and his own power to maintain control.141  From this point on, the 
Iranian public was locked out of politics while the shah exercised unrestrained power.  
One historian has wryly remarked that "[b]y the end of his reign, he had killed not only 
his former enemies, but the people who had helped him in his rise to power."142  Reza 
Shah began to lose supporters, even among the ranks of devoted nationalists. 
 The perpetual goal, really the raison d'être of the nationalist, is the preservation or 
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establishment of a state.  Without it, debates over the finer points of politics or policy are 
irrelevant.  In the early days of Reza’s rule, the early 1920’s, the intelligentsia had rallied 
behind the Cossack officer, seeing in him, rightly or wrongly, shades of the 
constitutionalist movement.  After the chaos and disorder of the previous decades, 
virtually all Iranian social classes, those opposed to him, and even the tribes at an early 
point, had a reason to support Reza Shah.143  He may have aroused opposition at various 
times, but between political cunning, personal prestige, and the realization that anarchy 
was likely to happen without a strong leader, it had been easier to attract supporters than 
opponents, at least, early on.  After his coronation in 1926, Reza took his state-building 
endeavor to the next level.  At the core of his program of modernization and 
centralization was his stated belief that "a strong army is the only means of saving the 
country from the miserable state of its affairs."144  Eventually, Iranians would discover 
exactly how central the military would be to the new shah's vision of the state. 
 
Domestic Challenges to the Central Government 
 The opponents of constitutional rule were the Qajar shah and his allies.  After 
Reza’s 1921 coup, it was clear that the Qajars had been, more or less, defeated.  The 
opponents of national sovereignty were the foreign imperialists who sought to control the 
country, but they could not be challenged until Iran came to become a modern, 
centralized state.  The biggest and most immediate challenges came from rebel groups 
and the country's sizeable nomadic populations.  Their defeat and subjugation would be 
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the first objective of the central government of Reza Shah. 
 Prior to the constitutional revolution, tribalism had long been an acknowledged 
and accepted factor in Iranian politics.  Not only were the Qajar shahs of tribal origins, as 
were their predecessors, but the royal court had nomadic traits as it shifted from summer 
homes to Tehran in the winter months.145  Qajar Iran's military was wholly inadequate to 
monitor the country and suppress insurrection, even after attempts were made during the 
nineteenth century to strengthen the force.  This left most power in the hands of tribal 
leaders and landowners, who could supply fighters when asked by the shah and were 
permitted to collect taxes to compensate for their expenses.  Iran's tribal levies, when 
fully mobilized, could number as many as eighty thousand well-equipped, expert fighters, 
but the loyalty of these men was to their own leaders, not the central government.146  
Even with the establishment of constitutional government in 1906, however, tribal 
contingents still exerted considerable power.  The royalist forces enjoyed the support of 
many tribal groups for a time, while the constitutionalist cause was taken up by the 
Bakhtiyaris, a prominent non-Persian speaking tribal confederation in southwestern Iran .  
Demonstrating the fickle nature of the tribal levies, they withdrew their support of the 
Qajar shah when he could no longer pay them.  Bakhtiyari backing of the constitution 
stemmed, not from affinity for the reformist program, but from a grievance against the 
shah and ambitions to gain power in the new government.147  The tribe would use its role 
in the revolution as a springboard to establishing itself for a time as a national political 
force and its members holding multiple government posts, including the position of prime 
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minister in 1909 and from 1912 to 1913.148   
 Tribal politics came into play again during and after the First World War, the time 
during which "the strength and the autonomous tendencies of the tribes and of local 
powers vis-à-vis the central government took on an unprecedented magnitude."149  The 
British, Russians, Ottomans, and Germans all sought and manipulated tribal allies to suit 
their needs during the war.  After the armistice, the British recognized Iran's vulnerability 
and, frightened by the specter of communist expansion, floated the possibility of using 
their client tribes to establish states in strategic locations in the event of a Russian 
invasion of the country and capture of Tehran.150  With their fluid loyalties and military 
power, Iran's tribes posed a serious challenge, even an existential threat, to the weak 
central government of the Qajars. 
   In addition to tribal groups, Iran was plagued by various other ideologically 
driven or regionalist movements that posed a threat to central authority.  The Jangalis of 
Gilan and the National Democratic Party (Firqeh-i Demokrat-i Azerbayjan) of Tabriz are 
two notable examples.  The Jangalis, also known as the Committee of Islamic Unity, 
were led by Mirza Kuchik Khan and operated out of Gilan.151  This movement, founded in 
1915, had pan-Islamist roots and was "opposed to large landlords, to the central 
government, and to tsarist Russia, and aimed at taking over all Iran, not breaking off from 
it."152  Kuchik is depicted, even by his opponents, as an earnest nationalist and Muslim on 
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a mission to remove foreign powers and liberate the country from its corrupt central 
government.153  It must be recalled that, even if these goals seem to correspond with 
those of the constitutional revolution, the Jangalis were just one of many entities who 
opposed the existing government in Tehran.  Moreover, the nationalism of the group 
appears not to have been so absolute.  At one point they turned down an offer from a 
Tehran political faction to advance on the city and establish a government on the grounds 
that their primary interests were local autonomy.154  Even more damning, Kuchik Khan 
accepted Bolshevik assistance for his cause, including the presence of the Red Army, 
which he only rejected when communist influence threatened to take control of the 
movement.155  
 The revolt of the National Democratic Party in Tabriz was similar to the Jangali 
effort.  Led by Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani, a former member of the majlis, this group 
was militantly opposed to foreign interventions into Iranian affairs but also had distinctly 
regional concerns.156  Unlike Kuchik Khan, Khiabani refused to accept a Soviet presence 
in Iran and even fought against the pro-communist German consul in Tabriz.157  Quite 
importantly, the movement was also driven by Khiabani's intense hatred for the British 
and his conviction that the central government served as their pawn. Aside from opposing 
foreign influence, the group's platform was largely centered on Azerbaijani grievances, 
mainly that its sacrifices during the revolution were not rewarded with the financial and 
political benefits that it deserved and that representatives of the central government sent 
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to Azerbaijan should be selected in accordance with the wishes of the local population.158  
Tehran's rule was not to be considered legitimate until their demands were met.159  
Because of the nature of its revolt, the National Democratic Movement cannot be seen 
wholly as a separatist movement, per se, but one that advocated the recognition of an 
element of local autonomy.      
 The strength and autonomy of these groups were antithetical to the centralizing 
ambitions of nationalists.  Not only did they take power from the hands of the Tehran 
authorities, but they provided foreign powers with accomplices to extend their influence 
in the country.  The tenuous nature of their allegiance to Tehran and the rivalries between 
them did nothing to alleviate the widespread instability in Iran.  Exactly how widespread 
disorder had become, how utterly impotent the central government had become, is 
astonishing.  General Hassan Arfa lists twenty-two insurrections of different natures, be 
they tribal, criminal, or driven by political motives, underway in the country on the eve of 
the coup that elevated Reza Shah to the national stage.160   
 In early 1921, American officials in Tehran recognized the extent of the chaos and 
its potential for inviting foreign, specifically Soviet, intervention, and suggested that if 
the Iranians could have the assistance of "at least thirty experienced American officers" to 
lead their military then local revolts could be crushed and, revealing their primary 
concern, Bolshevik influence could be minimized or negated "above all."161  The British 
also realized that the status quo was unsustainable and, under the terms of the hated 1919 
Anglo-Persian treaty, sent military advisors and equipment to the country.  Even if the 
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treaty reduced the country to a protectorate, as several American officials seemed to 
believe was the case,162 the military commitment made by Britain reflects its interest in 
building a viable Iranian state.  To put the matter more bluntly, the British needed an Iran 
with the capacity to maintain internal stability, as this was the only way to ensure that the 
country would not have the sort of discord that could invite or facilitate communist 
expansion.  That the desire to create a powerful centralizing authority would be a 
common interest between the British and Iranian nationalists is an ironic twist, but more 
importantly, foreign observers and Iranians saw the development of military power as the 
key to accomplishing this goal.  As Reza Shah's rule would show, military force would be 
instrumental in forging modern Iran. 
 
Reforming the Armed Forces:  A Brief Overview 
 Before delving into the development of the armed forces under Reza Shah's rule, 
it is necessary to say a few words about the development of the Western-styled military 
both in Iran and the Middle East in general.  By the late nineteenth century there was no 
question as to who dominated the globe.  Western, primarily European powers, had 
established vast empires that encompassed the world.  Their military might was 
unsurpassed, unrivaled by anything that non-Europeans could muster.  Granted, there 
were examples of Europeans being handed shocking defeats by "primitive" opponents, 
the Zulu triumph at Isandlwana in 1879 being one example, but these were the exception 
to a well-established rule.  Even the Japanese victory over the Russians during the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905, or the difficulties faced by the British in putting down the Boers in 
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the 1880’s could be quantified.  The Boers were of European descent, and the Japanese 
had applied the lessons of Europe in developing their power.  In order to close the 
military gap between the Europeans and themselves, Middle Eastern leaders sought to 
build modern armies that could hold their own on the field.163 
 European advisors and weapons had been brought to Egypt during the reign of Ali 
Bey al-Kabir, a Mamluk who ruled from 1760 to1773, but it was under Muhammad Ali 
(1805-1848) that "the first sustained program in the Middle East of state-sponsored 
Europeanization of the military" occurred, primarily with French support.164  In the late 
nineteenth century, forty-eight American Civil War veterans of the Union and 
Confederacy were summoned to Egypt by Ismail Pasha to modernize his military.  The 
ruler had paid close attention to reports of the fighting in America and was impressed by 
battlefield accounts and the might of the country's industry.  The officers he brought to 
Egypt were tasked with the wholesale modernization of the armed forces, a reform and 
reequipping effort that ranged from training, to organization, to the construction of 
fortifications, to the acquisition of modern arms.  These Americans even went so far as to 
lead Egyptian armies in the field.165   
 Elsewhere in the region, Ottoman Sultan Selim III had sought to update his 
military using the European model and created an entirely new infantry corps called the 
Nizam-i Jedid, or New Order, in 1797.  The force eventually expanded to twenty-three 
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thousand men but was ultimately doomed by its novelty, on one hand because it was not 
easily integrated into the rest of the armed forces, and on the other hand because of the 
opposition it generated from traditional sectors of the population.166  Reforms were 
inevitable, however, and the Ottoman military continued to evolve, at varying rates, from 
the 1820's until World War I.167  In the late nineteenth century, a German advisor was 
sent to Istanbul where he served for more than a decade.168 His influence can be seen in 
the Ottoman armies that took the field in 1914.  A great many of the weapons used by the 
Ottomans, small arms and artillery alike, were of German origin.  Most infantrymen 
carried some variant of a German designed Mauser into combat.  Even the Ottoman navy 
included ships that were purchased from their European allies.169   
 Like other powers in the region, Iran also turned to Europe for assistance in 
creating a national army.  As early as 1801, a treaty was negotiated with the British in 
which Iran would receive material and advisory support in the event of an attack on the 
country by France or Afghanistan.  When war broke out with Russia and the shah 
appealed for assistance, Britain was loathe to do anything that might undermine its 
improved relations with the other European powers and the pact collapsed.170  Real 
efforts to construct a Europeanized military began under Qajar prince Abbas Mirza 
(1789-1833), who, as governor of Azerbaijan, saw the frequent defeats of Iranian armies 
at the hands of the Russians as definitive proof that changes were necessary in order for 
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the country to defend itself.171  He was so convinced of the deficiency of Iran's forces that 
he forced Russian prisoners to train his men in European techniques and even formed a 
unit around a core of deserters from the Russian army.172  As early as 1807, the Treaty of 
Finkenstein between France and Iran compelled Napoleon to send officers to his new ally 
in order to reform the military forces there and to reconnoiter an invasion route to India.  
For the French, the partnership was mainly anti-British, but the Russian foe was the most 
pressing matter for the Iranians.  Under the treaty, a cannon foundry was constructed, 
soldiers trained, and fortifications were established, but these activities would be short 
lived.  Later that year, France signed a treaty with the Russians that essentially annulled 
the previous agreement with Iran.173 
 Not discouraged, Abbas Mirza turned back to the British for assistance in creating 
what he also called the Nezam-e Jadid, or New Order, at roughly the same time such 
efforts were taking place in the Ottoman Empire.174  The fact that new Ottoman and Qajar 
armies sprang up under the same moniker suggests a common outlook.  One cannot 
assume that military developments were based simply on a transmission from Europe to 
the Middle East.  Throughout history, the Iranians and Ottomans were frequently at 
war.175  It is entirely likely that, as these neighbors observed one another and met on the 
battlefield, they would learn lessons and borrow whatever models they deemed useful.  
The shifts between French and British support created a force in Iran that seemed to be a 
composite of influences.  The Iranian army’s weapons were British, its infantry and 
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cavalry mixed French uniforms with traditional Iranian garb, and its artillerymen were 
adorned with British uniforms and had only been forced to become clean-shaven after an 
unfortunate man's beard had been set ablaze by an errant spark.  The army simply fused 
Western appearances with Iranian traditions without any real attempt at adapting doctrine 
or command practices.  Without experts trained in the European style of command, 
logistics, or technological expertise, the New Order was at a severe disadvantage and 
suffered accordingly.176   
 When rushed into battle against the Russians between 1804 and 1813, what little 
success the reformed Iranian army enjoyed was overshadowed by the magnitude of its 
failures.  A European observer bemoaned the utter lack of order and discipline of Iran's 
military, from the task of raising, equipping, and maintaining an army to its handling on 
the ground.177  To be fair, however, Abbas Mirza's forces performed admirably against a 
larger Ottoman army, defeating it at the Battle of Erzurum in 1821, but this episode 
stands out as an anomaly.  From this early experience a pattern would ultimately emerge 
through the nineteenth century.  Iran would send officers abroad for training, such as to 
Austria in 1829, or host European officers, as it did British and French missions in 1836 
and 1839, respectively, before engaging in combat without making adequate 
preparations.  These expeditions inevitably resulted in Iranian defeat due to insufficient 
training and preparation, and might actually have witnessed the military becoming more 
and more unready with each campaign.178  Subsequent reform attempts produced 
elements that would shape later military developments, moving toward national unity and 
material self-sufficiency, but the Qajar dynasty was generally too weak to put together 
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the sort of broad-based transformation of society necessary for the desired modernization 
to take place.179  Tehran's lack of authority made it impossible to put together a force that 
could shift the balance of power on a domestic or international level.  The most 
significant and enduring military developments to take place before the rise of Reza Shah 
were set in motion by foreigners. 
 Three military organizations would prove critical for the future of the country.  In 
chronological order of their development, these were the Iranian Cossacks, the 
Gendarmerie, and the South Persia Rifles.  The Cossacks were the result of a strange 
confluence of Iranian royal and Russian interests.  A Qajar shah visiting Russia in 1878 
was significantly impressed by the Russian Cossacks to request some of their officers to 
be brought to Iran to organize a royal guard.180  The Persian Cossacks were established, 
trained, and led by Russians while Iranians filled its ranks.  For a time, the unit was well-
disciplined and well-paid, but funding soon dried up and the brigade shrank from more 
than a thousand to just two hundred men.  In 1884 the Cossacks were sent a new officer, 
Russian, of course, who set about expanding the roster and increasing professionalism.  
By the time of the Constitutional Revolution, the unit was the only viable military force 
in the country.  With its Russian officers, the force was typically seen by Iranians as the 
tool of a foreign power.181  Even Mohammad Reza Shah would concede in a 1961 book 
that this was the case and describe its formation as a type of Russian infiltration, going so 
far as to say that the foreign domination his father felt while serving under them would 
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inflame his sense of patriotism and nationalism.182  During the 1906 Constitutional 
Revolution, the Cossacks opposed the reform efforts and sided strictly and violently with 
the monarchy.  Only with the Bolshevik Revolution did the unit cease to serve the 
interests of the Russians, yet its legacy remained linked with the concept of autocracy.183 
 The Gendarmerie was, in many ways, a response to the influence of the Cossacks.  
Animosity between the units could be attributed to their differing outlooks and was 
manifested in a variety of ways.184  The origins of the Gendarmerie lie in 1912, when an 
American financial advisor sent to Iran in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution, W. 
Morgan Shuster, found the country to be in such a state of anarchy that taxes could not be 
collected.  In order to provide the central government with the means to gather resources 
from the population, Shuster saw to it that a Gendarmerie was established, originally 
under the command of a British officer.  The new organization fell in line with nationalist 
objectives, giving the central government a viable instrument of rule over the country.  In 
response to this newly asserted authority, the Russians refused Gendarmerie agents 
access to their sphere of influence in the northern portion of the country and had Cossack 
forces physically resist Shuster's efforts to collect taxes from their clients.185  The 
Gendarmerie came to be led by Swedish officers, as Sweden was a minor enough power 
that the British and Russians would tolerate the country having a presence in Iran.   
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 As the Gendermarie developed, it evolved into a mounted force with roughly ten 
thousand soldiers nationwide by the outbreak of the First World War.  Most of the 
personnel appears to be primarily of tribal origins.  One regiment was mainly composed 
of Kurds, Azerbaijani Turks, and Bakhtiaris, while another was characterized as being 
primarily Turki-speaking.186  The Gendarmerie tended to have a nationalist outlook, 
something reinforced by the decision to mix men from different regions when making 
units.  Because of this, it was viewed skeptically by the British and the Russians.  During 
the war, many of its members, incensed by the Allied violation of Iranian neutrality, 
joined the armed resistance against the British and Russians.187 
 In order to protect its interests in Iran during the First World War, mainly the 
preservation of a buffer zone between Russia and India and assurances that the Tehran 
government would remain pliable, Britain established a military force roughly 
corresponding to the Cossack brigades.  The South Persia Rifles, created in 1916, were 
charged with fighting the tribal and nationalist forces who resisted British occupation of 
the country.188  Nearly half of the five thousand men initially incorporated into the unit 
were merely a Gendarmerie force that was absorbed wholesale.  Later, five hundred of 
them would be dismissed for their hostility toward Britain.189  Toward the end of the war, 
the South Persia Rifles captured their nemesis in the region, Wilhelm Wassmuss, a 
German tasked by his government with organizing a rebellion, much as Col. Lawrence 
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had in Arabia.190  Most importantly, the force was used by Britain as a steppingstone to 
gain additional influence over the country, but also helped to spark the coup that led to 
Reza Shah's ascendance.  In 1919, a treaty between Britain and Iran was proposed that 
would have given the British advisory positions over the country's military, as well as 
granted them a monopoly on arms supplies and the ability to dismiss most of the Cossack 
officers .  Although the treaty was never ratified, the Russians responded to this perceived 
threat by occupying areas in their sphere of influence in the northern part of the country 
and supporting separatist groups, raising the ire of many Iranian leaders, including Reza 
Shah.191 
 The aforementioned three armed forces, combined with the earlier reform 
attempts of the nineteenth century, reveal the trajectory of military development in Iran.  
There are the parallel themes of foreign and domestic efforts, the interests and influences 
of foreign powers and the contrasting ambitions of Iran's leaders.  Each party worked to 
develop a force loyal to itself.  Even more critical is the fact that Iran lacked the ability to 
develop a military force with the ability to keep foreigners at bay.  Political and 
technological reasons both had a hand in this and would continue to do so into Reza’s 
reign as Shah.  After the demise of the Qajar dynasty in 1925, the Pahlavi shah would 
make a valiant and vain attempt to construct the military that Iran's leaders had wanted 
for more than a century.  A force would be developed whose power to crush domestic 
unrest was unsurpassed in modern Iranian history and whose successes within the country 
would lead to a fatal overestimation of its potency. 
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III.  (Re)Shaping Military and Society in Reza's Iran 
 
A Force in Transition: The Military of Reza Shah 
 When Reza and his co-conspirators launched their coup in early 1921, Iran's 
military was virtually nonexistent.  The Cossacks, consisting of roughly 8,000 Iranian 
officers and soldiers, and a foreign contingent of British officers, the Russians having 
been dismissed in 1920, were primarily paid for by the British.  The South Persia Rifles, 
organized in two brigades, could muster 190 Iranian officers, 5,400 other ranks, and 
about 300 commissioned and non-commissioned officers from Britain and India.192  
Numerically, the largest force in the country was the Gendarmerie with roughly 10,000 
men.193  Although an Anglo-Persian Military Commission recommended in 1919 that 
Iran take command of the Cossacks and South Persia Rifles, and also that the armed 
forces be expanded to 43,000 men, this had still not happened by 1921.  Neither had an 
air force been developed, as had been suggested.194  Recruits for the military were 
procured through a nineteenth century system, characterized by one historian as a 
primitive form of conscription, known as bunichah.  The bunichah system required 
different areas of the country to provide a certain number of men based on the amount of 
land under cultivation.195  The term itself was derived from the word bunah, which 
referred to an agricultural unit.196  Voluntary enlistment was also permitted.  This system 
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would linger on into the early years of Reza's command until replaced by a new type of 
conscription.197 
 According to Hassan Arfa, the rifles, machine guns, and artillery of the army were 
of various types and ammunition was in short supply.  Many tribal fighters were better 
armed than the government troops.198  Artillery purchased from Europe was unusable 
because Iranian soldiers "were quite incapable of handling them," likely from lack of 
training.  During training exercises, the artillerymen were forced to borrow carriage 
horses from the royal stables because they did not have their own animals to tow the 
guns.199  Even after Reza Shah began reforming the military, it was in such a dire state 
after years of neglect at the hands of the Qajars that campaigning soldiers sometimes ran 
out of ammunition and were forced to confiscate both rifles and ammunition from nearby 
civilians.200  These deficiencies can be tied to the overall weakness of the Qajar regime.  
In Stephanie Cronin's terms, "the condition of the army was, more generally, 
symptomatic of the profound failure of the Qajar state to embrace the measures necessary 
for its own survival."201  Quite simply, Iran lacked the institutions necessary to support a 
centralized military force, let alone an expansive Western army.  The fragmentation of 
the state under Qajar leadership is an even greater symptom of this failure.   
 Although it would take more than four years for Reza to work his way to the 
throne, his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Minister of War gave him 
considerable influence over the military almost from the onset of the 1921 coup.  The 
reforms he implemented were rapid and radical.  By December 1921, Iran's dual military 
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forces, the Cossacks and the Gendarmerie, were unified under a single command by 
Army Order Number One.202  Britain had the South Persia Rifles disbanded rather than 
be assimilated into Reza's new army.  Also unified were the various officer training 
schools, those for the Cossacks and Gendarmerie, into a single institution.203  Further 
stressing the Iranian-oriented nature of the new regime, most foreign officers were 
dismissed from their positions, apart from only a few Swedes and refugees from Russia 
who had taken up Iranian citizenship.204  These acts all worked to bolster the position of 
the central government.  A single military force, considering Iranian history, may have 
been a gamble, but the benefits it offered in the way of a clear hierarchy and chain of 
command were worth the risk.  Establishing a single military academy would allow for 
the creation of a single curriculum and ensure that cadets would receive a standardized 
program of indoctrination.  The removal of foreign officers meant the removal of at least 
one source of foreign influence.  On the whole, these reforms were intended to enhance 
the control of the central government over the military, from the classroom to the 
battlefield. 
 In order to become a viable force, as well as a truly national force, the military 
would need to grow in size and scope, drawing recruits from the entire population.  Even 
before the unification of the Cossacks and Gendarmerie, Reza, as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Army, Minister of War, Prime Minister from 1923 to 1926, and with powerful 
political allies, had ambitions to create an army of one hundred thousand men.205  Such 
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an expansion required, obviously, manpower, and also consumed additional financial 
resources.  Universal conscription was instituted in 1926 and gradually spread across the 
country as it could be enforced.  Conscription provoked widespread resistance that was 
largely suppressed by 1930.206  Under the terms of the conscription law, all males were 
subject to twenty-five years of military service upon reaching the age of twenty-one.  
Only two of these years, however, were to be active.  By drafting young men from rural 
areas into national service, discharged soldiers, exposed to life beyond their home 
villages, could be sent back to the periphery when the men's terms ended and would 
contribute to "the breakdown of provincial isolation."207  Military service was so widely 
believed to be instrumental in nation-building that building a small professional army was 
never even proposed.208  The large sizes of, and threats posed by, the British and Russian 
armies almost certainly helped to convince Iranians that their security required a similar 
large force. 
 Although one of the goals of conscription was to foster a sense of national 
identity, and, indeed, even non-Muslims were expected to perform military service, it was 
not always applied evenly.  Early on, it was only applied in Tehran, Qazvin, and 
Hamadan before being expanded elsewhere.  Government officials tasked with finding 
recruits would often accept bribes to either permit or exempt an individual from military 
service, and were even known to hold a family's domestic servants for ransom in 
exchange for an eligible recruit from their household.  Religious minorities, as well, 
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appear to have been unfairly targeted.  In Shiraz, a disproportionate number of Jews were 
drafted, and reports claim that recruiters in Kerman took every available Zoroastrian.209  
For the most part, however, compulsory service changed the face of the military and 
made it more representative of Iran's ethnic composition.  Traditionally, military recruits 
were ethnically Turkish or Azeri.210  Tribal levies served in homogenous units 
commanded by a chief from their own group.  Reza's reforms changed this system.  Even 
when tribal forces were summoned to support the military, they were placed in ethnically 
mixed units led by an officer.211  The expansion of government power into the Iranian 
periphery allowed for the integration of tribesmen and various minorities into the 
military.212  While the implementation of conscription targeted "the poorest and move 
defenseless sectors of society,"213 it was widespread enough to shift the burden of 
military service to a wider variety of ethnic groups than had existed under the Qajars.  
 Overall, the implementation of conscription brought the military from 40,000 men 
in 1926 to around 127,000 in 1941.214  With the full mobilization of reserves, this number 
increased to almost half a million.215  In terms of manpower, Reza Shah's army was 
radically different from the tiny force of the Qajars.  Far from the meager combination of 
Cossacks and Gendarmerie forces that made up the military in 1921, by 1941, Iran's army 
had grown to nine divisions and six independent brigades and regiments, including one 
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that was completely mechanized.216  Much of this growth took place during the 1930's, as 
is illustrated by the table below.217 
Iranian Military Manpower 
Year Manpower 
1920 Cossack Brigade: 202 officers, 7,856 other ranks 
South Persia Rifles: 190 officers, 5,400 other ranks 
Gendarmerie: 242 officers, 8,158 other ranks 
1925 All ranks: 28,000 
1930 All ranks: 40,000 
1935 Army: 1,507 officers, 30,872 other ranks 
Other: 2,488 officers, 68,952 other ranks 
1940 3,200 officers, 116,800 other ranks 
 
 
 The mission of American Arthur Millspaugh, sent to Iran in 1922 with the task of 
putting the country's finances in order, played an integral role in making military 
expansion economically feasible, just as the employment of military force made the 
collection of taxes possible.  The processes are directly linked and mutually enabling.218  
Millspaugh wrote that he recognized, based on the experiences of Morgan Shuster, that 
taxes could not be collected without military force.  Not only this, but he could not create 
a separate gendarmerie to exact taxes as Shuster had.  Military force had been 
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monopolized by Reza Shah.219  Millspaugh was, however, not averse to using force in 
order to get what he wanted.  The expansion of government power through the military's 
exploits brought new areas under control and made them liable to taxation.  It also 
allowed the military to confiscate land and pillage at leisure.  Much of the proceeds 
collected enriched the shah personally.220   
 A bureaucracy patterned after Western models was created to oversee 
administrative affairs.  This allowed resources, financial and material, to be collected and 
handled more efficiently.  Through tariffs, taxation, and the seizure of land acquired 
through the state's administrative apparatus, and, later, oil royalties, the government 
raised additional funds needed to finance the expansion of the military.221  Still, the 
corruption of the Qajar era persisted and, combined with mismanagement, caused even 
this additional revenue to be inadequate to the military's needs, and pay was often 
withheld to soldiers.  An American dispatch from 1930 even noted that when the amount 
of money spent on the armed forces was compared to their quality, it suggested that graft 
was occurring somewhere in the government.222  For example, a 1932 order for aircraft 
from a British factory cost £200,000.  A subsequent decision to mate the British airframe 
to an American engine, as well as to purchase ten spare engines brought the total to 
£331,000.  The purchasing mission, however, was allocated £1.5 million.223  One 
historian has estimated that of £18,412,000 designated for the purchase of European and 
American weapons between 1928 and 1941, roughly £4.5 million had been spent, with 
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the remainder likely going into the private accounts of the shah and his associates.224  
Eventually, it was necessary for Reza Shah to address the most egregious cases of 
corruption and improve the financial situation, but misconduct continued in spite of these 
efforts.225  The regularized collection of taxes and tariffs, and also the appearance of new 
taxes, enhanced the power of the central government at the expense of merchants who 
had traditionally been able to skirt the authorities.226  Millspaugh later wrote that Reza's 
taxation policies were ruinous, enriching a few individuals while harming the majority.227  
The favoritism shown toward a privileged few at the expense of the majority would 
eventually contribute to the shah's downfall. 
 At times, more than half of the Iranian budget was dedicated to military spending, 
but a precise figure cannot be identified due to the profits from oil not being recorded.  
Some estimates say it could have been as much as two-thirds of state expenditures.228  
Official budgets, excluding oil revenues, show defense spending to have consumed, on 
average, slightly more than a third of state funds.229  Education received just one-
fourteenth of the amount bestowed upon the military.230  While Millspaugh reported that 
military spending was unreasonable, he admitted that the security it provided against 
rebellion made his mission possible.  Tensions between Reza Shah and the Americans 
over disproportionate defense spending eventually brought about the termination of the 
mission in 1927.231  The table below looks only at the official Ministry of War allocations 
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of the Iranian budget during Reza's reign.  It does not include money designated for 
military-related areas, such as road or rail construction, road guards, or military 
education.  In this sense, it provides the lowest possible figures for defense 
expenditures.232 
Military Budget by Year 
Year Total Expenditures Ministry of War Percent of Total 
1925-1926 235,277,913 krans 100,253,000 krans 42.6 
1926-1927 253,556,720 krans 100,253,000 krans 39.5 
1927-1928 282,079,189 krans 98,789,033 krans 35 
1928-1929 451,707,725 krans 111,918,104 krans 24.7 
1930-1931 414,813,904 krans 152,339,897 krans 36.7 
1931-1932 373,000,000 krans 179,000,000 krans 47.9 
1932-1933 421,399,870 rials 153,079,980 rials 36.3 
1933-1934 506,904,460 rials 183,729,980 rials 36.2 
1934-1935 621,282,665 rials 203,729,980 rials 32.8 
1935-1936 750,827,790 rials 223,729,980 rials 29.7 
1936-1937 1,000,008,484 rials 243,729,980 rials 24.3 
1937-1938 1,248,031,737 rials 309,408,380 rials 24.7 
1938-1939 1,527,018,564 rials 354,408,380 rials 23.2 
1939-1940 2,613,481,987 rials 415,408,380 rials 15.8 
1940-1941 3,210,973,027 rials 463,729,980 rials 14.4 
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1941-1942 4,323,911,676 rials 565,121,564 rials 13 
 
 
 1924 negotiations between representatives of American oil companies and those 
of the Iranian government regarding road and rail construction offer additional insight as 
to Reza's intentions.  Foreign observers felt that Iran's long-term economic interests 
would be best served by first developing a robust road network capable of handling 
motorized vehicles.  Reza Shah's government, however, was primarily interested in 
developing a railway that would connect the Caspian to the Persian Gulf.  The American 
consul in Tehran, Bernard Gotlieb, felt that the perceived military advantages of having 
the two ends of the country linked by a direct line was behind this desire.  Regarding the 
financial burden and effort required for the undertaking, Gotlieb confessed, "I do not 
believe the Persian Government realizes the immense costs of such a project."233  Three 
years later, construction of the Trans-Iranian Railroad would begin, and would ultimately 
prove to be the most expensive single enterprise of Reza's reign.  Upon its completion in 
1938, the railway was estimated to have cost more than two billion rials, the equivalent of 
more than $140 million.   
 The special attention given to railroads does not mean that road construction was 
ignored.  In 1925, nearly ten million rials were allocated solely for highway construction 
projects, and a Ministry of Roads was created in 1930 to oversee the development of the 
country's road network.234  From 1923 to 1938, more than fourteen thousand miles of 
highway were constructed, much of which followed the migration routes of nomadic 
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tribes.  Placing roads in these locations permitted the Iranian army to interdict tribal 
groups as they relocated, rather than be forced to venture into unfavorable mountain 
terrain.235  The construction of  roads and railways where they would be militarily 
advantageous rather than economically beneficial, together with the amount of financial 
resources dedicated to them, reveals the focus of Reza's regime to have been on military 
pursuits.  Not only was a significant proportion of the budget set aside solely for the 
development of the country's army, but expensive civil engineering projects were 
initiated with military applications in mind.  Worth noting, however, is that the 
transportation infrastructure created under Reza Shah, while a marked improvement over 
the state of affairs under the Qajars, remained primitive by modern standards.  As Amin 
Banani notes, "in 1941, were an American or a western European to have traveled by 
road to Iran, he would have found it difficult to believe that any attempt had been made at 
road improvement.236  There simply was no miracle cure for Iran's material 
underdevelopment. 
 The Iranian army under Reza Shah may have increased exponentially in size and 
developed a centralized academy for officers, but its training generally remained poor 
and military capabilities suffered for this.  Reflecting the sorry state of education in 
general, commanders of military units were instructed to teach their soldiers how to read, 
write, and perform basic math.  Even with these directives, the national illiteracy rate 
remained around ninety percent after Reza Shah's abdication 1941.237  It appears as 
though officers were either unable to or neglected to carry out their orders.  One must 
wonder how effective a modern military force could be when the majority of its soldiers 
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were unable to read either a simple training handbook or complex instruction manual.   
 In 1922, the year after Reza took power, there were just 612 schools of all kinds, 
meaning state, private, elementary, and beyond, and 43,025 students nationwide.238  By 
1930, the numbers had risen to 1,048 elementary schools with 126,052 students.  Five 
years later, in 1935, there were 1,336 elementary schools and 170,077 students.239  
Between 1936 and 1940, the country saw an increase from 4,901 schools and 257,051 
students to 8,237 schools and 496,960 students.240  This statistical improvement did not 
yield substantive results.  At the time of his abdication, just one percent of the population 
attended elementary school, and education was never made compulsory.241  Most new 
schools were built in urban areas, and teachers assigned to the countryside resisted their 
appointments as a type of exile.242  A 1937 British report that Iranian aircraft had begun 
dropping propaganda leaflets on unruly tribesmen noted the uselessness of this tactic.  
Most of the country’s population, especially the vast majority of nomadic tribesmen, was 
virtually illiterate.243  The development of Iran's education system represents another 
example of Reza Shah's attempt to overcome the circumstances he inherited, and it, too, 
would be a transformation left incomplete. 
 Time spent on classroom instruction reduced the amount of time that could be 
spent turning conscripts into soldiers.  Generally, combat training was done under actual 
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combat conditions while putting down rebellions around the country.244  This meant that 
units would be experienced in the sort of campaigns that they would be most commonly 
faced with, namely insurrections.  What they would be wholly unfamiliar with was 
conventional combat, battle between states in which modern weapons, tanks, and aircraft 
would be pitted against similar weapons, tanks, and aircraft.  According to British 
military attaché Lt. Col. Dodd, training improved through time, although not as much for 
soldiers in the provinces.245  As late as 1940, another British military attaché observed 
that soldiers from Tehran performed maneuvers that were both too limited in scope to be 
of much use and too short in duration, possibly out of political concerns.246 
 Officers seemed to fare better than the rank and file.  In 1923, forty-six officer 
candidates were sent to Europe for training.247  Over the next ten years, Iran would 
continue to send groups of officers to train abroad.248  Top graduates from Iran's military 
academies were sent to St. Cyr, the French military academy, to study.249  One of these 
young men was Hassan Arfa, who later rose to the rank of General, and whose memoirs 
provide a fascinating glimpse into Iranian affairs in the early twentieth century.  As a 
young officer, Arfa was sent to train in Switzerland, and later to France with a group of 
about sixty officers, where he and his comrades received instruction from Europeans.250   
 Within Iran as well, numerous military academies were constructed to train the 
country's leaders.  In 1922, the Cossack training facility was merged with another 
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military school to create a unified military academy.  This school soon acquired such a 
reputation for quality that many Iranians who would typically have sent their sons to 
study abroad opted, instead, to enroll them in the military academy.251  A year later, in 
1923, three schools were organized in Tehran to cultivate officers for future service.  
Primary and secondary military schools were established to raise boys as young as seven 
years old in a martial environment.  After graduation from the intermediate school, boys 
would be sent to the Cadet College.252  Later, military schools were established in all of 
Iran's provinces.253  In spite of these innovations and efforts, little more than two 
thousand officers were academy graduates by 1941.254  These few graduates were 
insufficient to change the corrupt culture of the Iranian officer corps.  Moreover, by 1941 
there were roughly 3,200 officers and 116,800 other ranks in the Iranian army, a ratio of 
1:36.5.255  In the United States around the same time, this ratio was 1:13.256  Not only 
were there too few academy-trained officers to influence the general state of the officer 
corps, but commanders themselves were faced with high numbers of poorly trained, 
poorly educated soldiers.   
 Under the Qajars, generalships were handed out by the shah, and were sometimes 
bought, sold, or inherited.  Decidedly civilian individuals, including infants, were listed 
upon the rolls of officers.  Unit commanders were notorious for using their positions to 
achieve personal profit, selling commissions, discharges, and even rations to their 
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subordinates.257  The situation did not improve dramatically under Reza Shah.  
Corruption remained so endemic that Mohammad Reza Shah addressed it explicitly in 
one text, saying that even his "father's vigorous efforts did not entirely stamp out 
corruption."258  The fact that this admission could not be omitted speaks volumes.  Other 
accounts support the claim that Reza Shah was aware of problems of discipline and 
training, and also that he took steps to rectify them.259  Ironically, when it came to 
corruption, Reza was likely the worst offender.260  On top of this, he tacitly approved of 
his former Cossack colleagues’ pursuit of personal wealth.261 
 If corruption was inherited from the Qajar period, the new regime created its own 
pitfalls.  Political reliability, under the first Pahlavi ruler, was paramount over merit, and 
ambitious officers worked to intrigue their way to promotion and profit or to discredit 
their opponents who sought the same.  As a result of frequent dismissals and 
reassignments, the military was in constant disarray, lacking enough competent leaders to 
organize an effective system of logistics or even to gain the trust of the rank and file.262  
During many of its operations within the country, the undisciplined government soldiers 
looted, requisitioned, and extorted from the locals openly and at will.263  The deficiency 
of command, the ineffective leadership of the officer corps, is manifest here.  More 
relevant to the military's performance in combat conditions, capable, independent leaders 
were suspect in such an environment.  One commander was even suspended because the 
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shah felt that he was trying to acquire too much influence.264  When war came, it is 
entirely possible that the best officers in the country, those most able to lead troops 
against an invasion, had been brushed aside by those more adept at political maneuvering 
than leadership. 
 In terms of weapons procurements, the Iranian military under Reza had begun to 
take on the semblance of a viable force.  Small arms confiscated from tribesmen and 
others purchased from European suppliers initially filled the need.265  Facilities were also 
established to allow for copies of European rifles to be built within Iran, although this 
was on a limited basis before the early 1930's.266  In order to service existing weapons, as 
well as to develop production capabilities, European technicians were hired.  In late 1923, 
a German engineer was brought in to do both of these tasks, though a weapons factory 
was not built under his leadership.267  Eventually, however, Iran was able, primarily with 
German assistance, to produce arms domestically at the rate of twenty-five rifles and fifty 
thousand rounds of ammunition daily.268  By 1939, a machine-gun factory was under 
construction, although it is unclear whether or not it was finished before the Anglo-Soviet 
invasion in 1941.269  While not a full-fledged arms industry, this was a step toward self-
sufficiency and independence, albeit a small one.  It was of more symbolic than practical 
benefit.  By the late 1930's, parading units were seen by American observers to be 
outfitted with machine guns and automatic rifles, as well as an assortment of horse-drawn 
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and mechanized artillery pieces.270  Still, a significant amount of artillery was antiquated, 
and cavalry, much of it anachronistically armed with lances, remained central to military 
planning.271  British officials in Iran shortly after the invasion of 1941 reported observing 
a division of cavalry of which each regiment had machine guns and four artillery pieces, 
but few motorized vehicles.272  Iran's small arms and artillery, consequently, can be seen 
as emblematic of the military in general.  Steps toward modernization had been made and 
aspirations, however unrealized, had been unleashed, but the core of the force was still 
thrown together ad hoc and constructed around relics of the past.   
 The purchase and acquisition of armor and motorized vehicles are also revealing.  
In 1924, in addition to small arms and ammunition, military vehicles from Germany 
began arriving in Iran.273  These supplemented a collection of French tanks and tractors 
and a pair of British armored cars.274  Eventually, the bulk of Iran's armored vehicles, 
fifty AH-IV tankettes and fifty TNH tanks, were of Czechoslovakian origin.275  The TNH 
tanks were the export variant of a type used in Europe during World War II, most notably 
by the Germans, who designated it the Panzer 38(t), until it was phased out in 1942.276  
The relative quality of these vehicles is worth noting and their procurement by Iran 
should be seen as a political statement by Reza Shah.  Even if limited in number, 
possessing modern tanks, practically the same as those operated by European states, 
allowed the Iranian government to lay a claim to having a modern army.   
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 Political posturing in lieu of practicality is a recurring theme in the purchase and 
deployment of armored assets.  In the mid 1930's, a significant diplomatic dispute 
between the United States and Iran began after several American newspapers described 
Reza's rise in terms of a stable boy to king story.277  So incensed was the shah over this 
perceived insult that a contract with the Indianapolis based Marmon-Herrington company 
for another delivery of armored cars was cancelled.  Even with this cancellation, Iran 
could still field twenty-four armored cars, of which four were supplied by British Rolls-
Royce and the remainder by Marmon-Herrington, on the eve of the Allied invasion of the 
country in 1941.278  Still, the fact that an order for vital military hardware could be 
cancelled outright, not simply delayed or given to a rival company, is startling and raises 
questions of "why?"  The answer seems to be that these vehicles were of greater symbolic 
importance than practical use.  As early as 1924, the early days of Reza's relevant period, 
Rolls-Royce armored cars operated in Tehran and "constituted a 'potent argument' in 
political crises."279  While they were conspicuously included in military parades, these 
and other vehicles were noticeably lacking from the battlefields around the country.280   
 The reasons for this absence reveals the true nature of Iran's military under Reza 
Shah.  First, the vehicles had not been properly maintained to ensure that they could 
operate in combat conditions.  Second, the transportation infrastructure of the country, at 
least early on, could not guarantee that they would even be able to arrive at remote 
locations where they might be needed.  Finally, the lack of maintenance and poor roads 
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meant that deploying armored cars would be a task fraught with peril, and the vehicles 
were "too valuable a political asset in the capital to risk in warfare with the tribes."281  To 
reiterate the point more bluntly, having armored cars was more important than being able 
to use them.  Presenting the appearance of having a modern military was more important 
than actually operating like one.  Reza Shah's mechanization efforts were primarily 
symbolic reforms, not wholesale transformations of the Iranian army.  Even into the 
1930's, most soldiers deployed around the country were moved by civilian transports, not 
military trucks.282  The window-dressing of a few tanks, trucks, and armored vehicles 
may have won approval within Iran, but powerful neighbors with tanks, trucks, and 
vehicles of their own would not be so easily impressed by the display. 
 The development of Iran's air force further illustrates the politics of arms 
procurement and deployment as well as the divergence between the practical military and 
the unrealistic ideal force.  Air power had made great strides during the Great War and 
post-war demonstrations suggested that, in the future, battles would be won from above.  
In neighboring Iraq, the British Royal Air Force proved instrumental in crushing revolts 
and, by 1922, became the primary tool of British military power in the country.283  
Iranian leaders, apparently taking notice of this, began building an air force in 1923 and 
within a few years had collected a number of French, German, and Russian aircraft, each 
of which was accompanied by instructor pilots from their corresponding countries.  Later, 
purchasing agents sought out British and American airplanes and parts.284  In time, the 
force would be outfitted almost entirely by British companies, and an aircraft assembly 
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plant near Tehran would be administered by experts and technicians imported from 
Britain.285 
 Almost as soon as they attempted to establish one, Iranian leaders found that 
operating an air force was a difficult undertaking.  Not only are trained personnel 
necessary for virtually every aspect of maintaining and flying an airplane, but proper 
facilities are needed for maintenance and storage.  Iran lacked both personnel and 
facilities, a situation that was not eased by the country's unforgiving climate and terrain 
and the relatively primitive state of aviation in the early twentieth century.  In the early 
days, aircraft were lost to accidents as quickly as they were being purchased from 
Europe.286  The wide range of machines flown and subsequent problems with the 
availability of spare parts, the lack of trained personnel, primitive conditions, difficulties 
with Iran's weather and absence of a meteorological service all contributed to a situation 
in which, by 1930, only thirty aircraft were operable nationwide.287   
 In the opinion of American officials, even in 1940, the Iranians did not possess 
the skills to successfully operate a modern air force.288  These were not simply technical 
skills, the ability to keep an aircraft mechanically sound, but the knowledge of how to 
actually fly an airplane.  During one flight, a terrified pilot informed General Hassan Arfa 
that the mountain they had intended to fly over was, in fact, higher than the ceiling of the 
German aircraft that he was piloting.  With insufficient room to turn around, the pair 
continued on a collision course with the mountain until spared by a fortuitous current of 
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air that lifted them over the peak with little more than a few feet to spare.289     
 The transition to purchasing mainly British aircraft, essentially a move to 
homogenize the air force, streamlined logistics and allowed Iran to increase the number 
of serviceable craft to 154 by 1936, and to 245 by the Allied invasion of the country in 
1941.  It also allowed for aircraft to be manufactured in the country, albeit under British 
supervision.290  Because of the aforementioned difficulties, foreign assistance was 
necessary to initiate and facilitate the development of an air force.  Assistance, however, 
can very easily become an unhealthy dependence or allow for a foreign power to exercise 
influence to bolster its own interests.  Moreover, it provides the seller, or patron state, an 
additional political interest in the purchasing country, as Hassan Arfa, whose brother was 
tasked with buying airplanes for the country, points out.291  This would be the case 
between Britain and Iran.  Evidence suggests that Iranian officials were discouraged from 
contracts with American companies by individuals with pro-British inclinations.292   
 Even if Iranian efforts to work with American companies bore few fruits, the fact 
that they attempted to court the United States illustrates the political challenges faced by 
Reza Shah.  In early 1940, Iranian officials contacted an American diplomat and 
expressed their interest, not simply in aircraft produced in the United States, but in 
American technicians to service these planes and their related factories.  The American 
was skeptical of the official explanation provided for the personnel shift: that the 
acquisition of American planes would warrant the adoption of a new system.  Instead, he 
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felt that the shift reflected Soviet pressure on the country.293  His suspicions were 
justified.  The aggressive policies of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia 
had unnerved the Iranians, who offered in 1940 to work with the British to develop 
defensive plans against their powerful northern neighbor.294  Even a treaty between Iran 
and the Soviet Union signed that same year made concessions to the Russians so that the 
status quo remained worrisome, even if tensions had been somewhat eased.295   
 In December 1940, prior to Operation Barbarossa, the 1941 German invasion of 
the Soviet Union, diplomats from those two countries attempted to negotiate an alliance.  
Among Stalin's territorial demands that Hitler could not accept, was, essentially, a call for 
control of Iran and its oil.296  As previously noted, the Iranians were suspicious of their 
northern neighbor's intentions and were willing to work with the British to defend 
themselves.  An alliance with Britain, however, was dangerous.  With the outcome of the 
war in Europe still uncertain, such an arrangement could potentially incur the wrath of 
Germany, whose economic links with Iran had grown exponentially prior to the war.  
More critically, the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty of friendship permitted the Soviets to 
invade the country if it was used "as a base of operations against Russia," which spoke 
directly to British activities at the time.297  By 1940, the threat posed by a Soviet Union 
increasingly bellicose in Europe demanded action, and in this case Iran attempted to use 
the United States in lieu of Britain as a counterbalance.  American involvement would 
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draw a third party into the political scene while reducing British influence and allaying 
Soviet concerns. 
 In spite of skepticism regarding the impetus for Iran's interest, the United States 
was willing to consider offers, but seemed overwhelmed by the requests placed upon it.  
American officials placed the Iranian diplomats in contact with representatives of aircraft 
manufacturers and expressed a willingness to arrange additional contacts if necessary.298  
What they could not handle were the substantial numbers of aircraft that were requested.  
Reza Shah wanted fifty heavy bombers and thirty fighters in addition to ten fighters 
already purchased from the Curtiss aircraft company.299  With America increasing its 
own stockpile of armaments while simultaneously working to fulfill foreign orders, 
particularly those made by the British, already in place, there was simply no way to 
provide Iran with the aircraft it desired and it would not accept models that were 
available but that had not been adopted by the United States.300  Delivery, according to 
one estimate, might not even have been possible eighteen months in the future.301   
 A fascinating "what-if" scenario emerges when one considers the specific types of 
aircraft that Reza Shah desired.  American documents name the requested fighters as 
either "Curtiss P 46" or "North American 73."302  These references can be interpreted to 
represent projects by the Curtiss and North American companies that were still in their 
experimental phases, the XP-46 and NA-73X, respectively.  The first, the Curtiss design, 
was found to have decent performance but limited operational range and was not placed 
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into production after trials.303  The second would go on to become the legendary P-51 
Mustang, often regarded as the greatest fighter aircraft in history, and would continue to 
serve the air forces of more than fifty countries decades after its first flight.304  While the 
state of Iran's military was so poor that these aircraft would not have made much of a 
difference in opposing the Allied invasion,305 one cannot help but imagine the spectacle 
of Iranian Mustangs tangling with British Spitfires in the skies above the desert.  Still, it 
bears repeating that these were highly technical aircraft whose modern technology 
required a level of skill and precision that, not only did the Iranians not have, but that 
made manufacturing engines difficult even for the United States.306  Hypothetical 
fantasies aside, this episode also illustrates the role of arms procurements in political 
maneuvering.  Courting American companies would allow Reza Shah to shed the British, 
placate the Soviets, draw in the United States, and continue to impress at home.  Britain, 
however, would not remain idle while Iran worked to escape its influence.  Additionally, 
the fact that Iran sought aircraft so cutting-edge that they had not even been put into mass 
production attests to Reza Shah's obsession with appearances.  That both aircraft were 
largely untested prototypes, that they were expensive, that Iran would field relatively few 
of them, and that their maintenance would be substandard were irrelevant.  What was 
important, again, was the projection of power, not its possession. 
 Although the further thirty fighters desired by Iran would never materialize, 
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delivery of the ordered Curtiss fighters was scheduled to begin in early 1941.307  This 
scheduling would prove overly optimistic, as shipment of the aircraft was delayed 
repeatedly, pushing back delivery until much later in the year.  British influence and 
interference played a large role in this.  Britain had halted shipments of aluminum aircraft 
parts to Iran out of fear that they would end up in German hands.308  This paranoia 
eventually spread to the United States, prompting the Americans to use the Neutrality Act 
as a means to temporarily withhold delivery of Iran's Curtiss Hawk aircraft.309  At one 
point, the American minister in Iran was bluntly asked by his superiors whether or not he 
felt that war materials sent to the country would be sent to the Germans or Soviets.310  
Because examples of the Curtiss Hawk had been provided to France and Norway before 
the war, had performed admirably, and were now commandeered by Germany in some 
way, this was a plausible concern.  It would not be until May 20, 1941, that permission 
was given to dispatch the ships carrying the aircraft.311   
 Even after permission to ship Iran's fighters had been granted, British officials 
contacted the Americans to request that no further airplanes, parts, or war materials be 
sent to Iran for fear that they would be used against British forces in the region.312  The 
reason cited for this request was that Iranians had always been anti-British, and recent 
German successes against the Soviets made it entirely possible that their forces might 
reach the Caucasus and the Iranian frontier.  American diplomats understood this concern 
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but felt that their offerings to Reza Shah were too meager to improve significantly the 
effectiveness of the military, and that stopping shipments would have a negative impact 
on a relationship that might become important in the near future.  Furthermore, they were 
confused as to why Britain continued to operate an aircraft factory in Iran and why the 
British planned on beginning production of Hurricane fighters, much more advanced than 
the aging Hawk, while urging the United States to remain on the sidelines and keep 
antiquated but desired materials out of Iranian hands.  The British admitted that their 
position might, on the surface, seem illogical, but emphasized their need to keep Reza 
Shah "sweet" and to keep their technicians in the country.313  By late July, the British had 
conceded that delivery of parts could proceed uncontested.314  Although the effort to halt 
the shipment of aircraft to the Iranians failed, Britain's delaying tactics succeeded.  
Already, on July 11, 1941, the British Chiefs of Staff had begun exploring the possibility 
of taking military action in Iran in conjunction with the Soviets, which would occur in 
August of that year.315  When the invading British forces reached the Ahvaz airbase, they 
seized nine Hawk fighters still in their shipping crates due to the delay in delivery.316  
 
Conscripting the State:  The Military and Iranian Society 
 In September 1938, the American Legation in Tehran cited an article in the 
Journal de Tehran celebrating Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Crown Prince of Iran.  The 
article itself featured several pictures of the prince with the caption "His Imperial 
Highness the Crown Prince Practicing the Profession of a Soldier," and described his 
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martial training.  Mohammad Reza was heralded as, not just an example for Iran's youth, 
but an example for all Iranians, as well as the recipient of "so perfect an education."  The 
dispatch stated that this presentation of martial ability was intended to build the Crown 
Prince up as a "worthy successor" to the throne and pointed out that his associates were 
mainly military officers.317  Altogether, these documents speak volumes as to the role of 
the military in the public sphere during the reign of Reza Shah.  Four critical themes are 
present here:  martial prowess as a legitimizing factor in a ruler, the existence of a 
military elite, the importance of the military to Iran as a whole, and the need for Iranians 
to behave as soldiers in the service of the nation. 
 Portraying royalty as skilled warriors was not necessarily a Pahlavi innovation.  
Consider the warrior kings of the Shahnameh, such as Rostam who was "an elephant in 
strength" and who "plunged the world in blood."318  The concept of the soldierly shah can 
be seen as an emanation of the Iranian tradition of charismatic leadership.  Iran's leaders 
"ruled by force of individual personality" and needed to display royal charisma, farr in 
Persian, to be considered legitimate.  A new dynasty, such as that which Reza Shah 
began, needed to assert this trait in order to be accepted.319  By defeating the rebellious 
tribes and groups that threatened the central government, Reza Shah boosted his military 
prestige and his legitimacy.  In November, 1924, he personally led a force to confront a 
rebellious leader, who promptly surrendered.320  His successes were rewarded, in the 
earliest phases of his rule, with expressions of gratitude and the grant of political 
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power.321  This led to the establishment of a cult of personality around him, one that 
connected him, rhetorically, to the heroes of the past and that caused even his opponents 
to emphasize his strengths over his shortcomings.  At his coronation in 1925, Reza 
surrounded and adorned himself with the weapons and armor of past leaders, including 
"the sword of Nader Shah [who had reunited the country in 1736 after a period of 
anarchy and has been called the Napoleon of Persia] and a royal scepter, which the Shah 
wore, while other artifacts of royalty not worn...included the swords of Shah Abbas the 
Great and Shah Ismail, Nader Shah's bow, and Shah Ismail's armor."322  In all subsequent 
public appearances, the new shah wore a military uniform.323 
 Reza Shah's Iran was dominated by a military elite.  This is not to say that officers 
were disproportionately represented in the government.  Iran's cabinets remained mainly 
civilian during Reza's time as prime minister, and became even more so following his 
coronation.324  Instead of having disproportionate representation, the military had 
disproportionate power.  Civilian leaders found that their authority did not extend over 
military officers, whose interference in administrative affairs was so pervasive that 
several provincial governors even resigned their positions.325  In fact, Reza's very rise to 
power was facilitated by military commanders who threatened to take action against 
civilian leaders who opposed him.326  When areas were placed under formal military rule, 
local commanders spearheaded modernization efforts, such as in Shiraz where one officer 
oversaw the demolition of property to allow for street widening.  Other occasions saw 
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gangs of soldiers forcibly conscripting civilians to work on construction projects, and 
exempting those who could bribe their way out of it.327 
 Aside from the distinction between military and civilian leadership, Iran's armed 
forces were divided internally between a core of privileged elites and the non-elite 
personnel.  Generally, this can be understood in terms of the rift between the country's 
senior officers and the bulk of its forces.  Most junior officers came from the lower end of 
the middle class and felt that the military could be used as a way to improve their social 
status.  In reality, their prospects were hampered by the fact that most senior positions 
were monopolized by Reza Shah's allies.328  Another rift existed between the officer 
corps and the common conscript.  As the supreme military leader of the country, Reza's 
conduct established a dangerous precedent for his officers to follow.  He diverted state 
funds into his private account and acquired enormous tracts of land through extortion or 
murder.329  It has even been speculated that the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railroad 
was motivated, in part, by a desire to connect his agricultural holdings in the north with 
markets in the south.330  If his personal example was not enough, he also created a bank 
specifically for the military that allowed "additional opportunities for shady deals."331  
The old Cossack officers, Reza's former comrades who commanded the new military, 
were essentially free to abuse their power in the pursuit of material wealth.332  Officers 
enjoyed a higher standard of living than most Iranians, could buy land at discounted 
                                                                                                                                                                             
326 Cronin, The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 194-195. 
327 Ibid., 199-200, 208-210. 
328 Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century, 104. 
329 For a particularly illustrative, if biased, account, see Majd, Great Britain and Reza Shah, 145-154. 
330 Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century, 102. 
331 Ward, Immortal, 147. 




prices, and had access to an impressive club in Tehran.333  The military was Reza's 
darling and its leaders, well aware of this, took full advantage of their favored position. 
 After reversing years of foreign occupation and the near disintegration of the 
state, it is little wonder that the Iranian military would be celebrated as an emblem of the 
nation.  Reza Shah's government portrayed the armed forces as critical to the existence of 
the Iran.  Additionally, steps were taken to make the military an instrument of national 
indoctrination while simultaneously giving it a more distinct "Iranian" character.  A 
speech delivered by the shah in 1931 to students headed abroad illustrates perfectly the 
presentation of the military to the public: 
You will render full service to your country only when you 
have served in the army.  Military service is one of the 
essential duties as a patriot, especially of the student class.  
Military service strengthens the spirit and prepares the 
mind for work.  It is my opinion that students completing 
the middle schools and even those finishing the higher 
courses should serve in the army for a time, even though 
for a shorter period than is ordinarily required.  Thus, they 
will be able to render more satisfactory service and provide 
more useful to the country and to the protection of its 
interests.  Then you and the Crown Prince will be equal in 
my sight.334 
 
It was through armed service that one became an Iranian.  The military was the conduit to 
citizenship.  Apart from speeches, this position was made explicit by the expansion of 
conscription.  The same year that Reza Shah made the above speech, he rescinded an 
earlier concession made to the ulama and demanded that all theology students serve in the 
military upon completing their studies.335  There could be no exemptions from national 
service.  In 1939, the Crown Prince made a speech that declared the military career to be 
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more important than any other.336  National service was something that every Iranian 
should perform because it was the highest duty that one could do. 
 Framing citizenship in terms of military service elevated masculinity at the 
expense of Iranian women.  Although the prospect of conscripting women during 
wartime was discussed in 1938, nothing seems to have come of the proposition.337  Iran's 
women were deprived of full citizenship by the rhetoric of Reza Shah's regime because 
they could not perform military service.  Much has been made of the improvements in the 
status of women during Reza's reign, and there is certainly much to be said for the 
reforms in family law, education, and such that benefited Iran's female population338  The 
elevation of the military and veneration of military service as an aspect of citizenship, 
however, means that the policies regarding women must be seen in a different context.  
Simply put, women were intended to produce citizens, not necessarily to become citizens 
themselves.  Prior to the rise of Reza Shah, around the time of the Constitutional 
Revolution, Iranian reformers stressed the need for women to be educated in order to 
better train their children.  A mother who had been indoctrinated with nationalist 
ideology would, as primary caregiver, pass those lessons along to her children.  Faced 
with a fractious political climate and little national unity, reformers hoped that women's 
education would help to create a "homogenous national culture [that] could reinforce the 
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necessity of obedience to authority at an early age."339  In 1924, an Iranian reformer 
wrote that "[women's] greatest responsibility in society is to create a family and maintain 
a household."340  Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet notes that what a woman was to maintain was 
"a home that instilled the virtues of conformity, obedience to men, and patriotism."341  
The dominant position of the male in Iranian society was reinforced by Reza Shah's 
elevation of the military, not challenged by it.   
 A book published in Iran in 1947 entitled The Twenty-Five Years History of the 
Imperial Iranian Army further illustrates the presentation of the military in public 
discourse.342  Although it deals with the period after Reza Shah's abdication, considering 
both its temporal proximity to the first Pahlavi shah and his son's admission that "my 
father influenced me more by far than has anyone else,"343 it may be assumed that it is 
indicative of the state of affairs during Reza’s reign.  Through and through, the book is a 
piece of propaganda designed to aggrandize the Iranian military.  When presented in 
images, units are in parade formations, proudly displaying their arms, while surrounded 
by an adoring public.  The captions to these pictures only serve to embellish the heroism 
and grandeur of the soldiers.  A column of tanks parading in single file is artfully 
described as navigating "handsomely" and "with order."344  Elsewhere, the shah and his 
officers are surrounded by adoring crowds of Iranians young and old, male and female, 
even clergymen.  Repeatedly, king and cohort are described as beloved.345  Reza Shah, 
even after his abdication and death, is presented as the father of the Iranian army and of 
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Iranian independence.346  The military, led by a soldierly shah, is a source of pride and 
the object of affection.  When this presentation is considered in conjunction with the 
aforementioned article from the Journal de Tehran,347 the effort, on the part of the 
government, to portray the armed forces as an emblem of Iranian statehood is made clear. 
 In conjunction with elevating the merits of military service and the role of the 
armed forces, Reza Shah's Iran was marked by the imposition of martial order upon the 
civilian population as well.  This was especially noticeable when it came to Iran's 
children.  In 1923, an article in a journal titled Pahlavi, which typically covered military 
topics, discussed the merits of sports, their benefit to the body, and the need to create a 
culture of health that would, in turn, create a healthier civilization.  Not long after this, in 
1927, a law was passed that made physical fitness an essential part of the country's 
academic curriculum for schoolchildren, both male and female.  Around the same time, 
an Iranian version of the Boy Scouts, and later the Girl Scouts, was chartered with the 
purpose of advancing virtuous behavior and a culture of fitness.  Scout leaders, of course, 
were expected to behave in accordance with nationalist ideals.  One intellectual 
celebrated scouting as "an effective way to promote physical and spiritual fitness in the 
interest of forging a more industrious and powerful citizenry."348   
 The existence of scouting and fixation on a culture of health, when combined with 
other factors, such as the presentation of scouts in public discourse, reveals the 
government's attempt to impose military structure upon the civilian population.  Like 
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soldiers, scouts marched in parades attended by the "beloved shah."349  Even youths who 
were not involved in scouting were expected to show such order.  Before scouting was 
made compulsory in 1939, male students in Tehran were subject to weekly parades and 
drills under the supervision of army officers.  Senior boys around the country were 
expected to drill in preparation for parades commemorating Reza's coup.350  Such 
measures suggest that the central government's interest in education was inspired, in part, 
to "imbue [students] with a sense of 'authority.'"351  School children paraded for the shah 
in each town he visited, and these parades were said to be a real source of pleasure for 
him.352  Coinciding with the conscription of boys into scout troops in 1939, older boys 
became "required to spend four hours a week in military drill, weapon familiarization, 
and indoctrination courses," taught by army officers, as an essential part of their studies. 
 During a 1938 "Youth Festival," the Crown Prince and his brothers, all wearing 
scout uniforms, observed a parade of boy and girl scouts, along with cadets from Tehran's 
military schools.  During the event, the scouts performed fire-fighting and first aid drills 
before closing the ceremonies with a "demonstration of mass physical training by over 
2,000 youths."353  The Iranian press further appropriated the scouts into national 
mythology in the titles of the many articles published about them: "Our Youth," "Our 
Girls," "Our Prowess at Swimming."354  By making Iran's youth, our youth, as they were 
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claimed, morally upright, physically strong, deferential to authority, and disciplined, they 
would be well suited to serve, not just as soldiers, but as productive citizens of the Iranian 
nation.  That the Cossack turned king, Reza Shah, would take a strong interest in and 
derive so much joy from the process can hardly be a surprise. 
 The adults of Iran may not have been made to march for the shah's amusement, 
but they were not spared the militarizing efforts of the new regime.  These could be seen 
in the Pahlavi push for social standardization.  Reza Shah's vahdat-i melli, or "national 
unity," campaign aimed at creating a national culture based on the primacy of "Persian" 
culture.355  Across the country, non-Persian-speaking schools and presses were gradually 
whittled away and replaced with Persian variants.356  The Society for Public Guidance, a 
copy of European fascist propaganda ministries, worked to change place names of non-
Persian origin.  In 1935, the government attempted to remove Arabic and Turkish words 
in an attempt to create a distinctly Iranian language.357  The units and ranks of the 
military were also renamed with Persian titles in an effort to eliminate traces of foreign 
influence from the national force.358  Honorific titles were similarly abolished, weakening 
social distinctions in what can be seen as a move to foster a spirit of fraternity among 
Iranians.  All of these measures were taken around 1935, the year that "Persia" was 
renamed "Iran," a name with a racial, not regional, connotation.359 
 The drive for standardization did not end with attempts to bolster the use of the 
Persian language or to assert Iran's purported connection to the birthplace of the mythical 
Aryan race.  Perhaps nowhere is Reza Shah's arbitrariness and quest for uniformity more 
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evident than in the creation of a national uniform.  By dictating what Iranians wore, Reza 
felt he could further undermine the power of the clergy while simultaneously 
modernizing the average citizen.  The precise wording of the Uniform Dress Law, passed 
December 28, 1928 is an astonishing and chilling example of authoritarianism in 
practice: 
Article I. All male Iranian subjects who are [not] required 
to wear special clothing in conformity with service in the 
government shall wear uniform clothing within the country; 
and all government employees, whether civil or judicial, 
shall, when on government duty, wear civil or juridical 
clothing, as officially prescribed, and at other times they 
shall wear the uniform attire.360 
 
Exemptions were granted only to members of the clergy and theological students on the 
condition that they could verify their positions.361  For students, verification entailed the 
successful completion of an examination in their particular field.362  The imposition of a 
dress code also deprived the tribes, whose clothing reflected their affiliation, of a form of 
expression.  The array of costumes and colors that were seen to decorate Tehran's streets 
before Reza's coronation363 were banished to history, replaced with hats, jackets, shirts, 
and pants that lacked "distinguishing marks" and "off-putting colors."364  Clothing was 
further standardized, and nationalized, in 1930 when a law was passed requiring 
schoolchildren and government employees to wear clothing whose cloth was made in 
Iran.365  Women, too, were subject to the shah's plans, and were unveiled in 1935, 
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forcibly, if they refused to comply.366  These steps were undertaken to create a new type 
of Iranian, a modern Iranian, who looked, thought, and acted in the same manner as their 
compatriots.  Reza Shah seems to have seen civilians as a branch of the military, things to 
be commanded and controlled.  Although they were not under arms, Iranian civilians 
were fashioned to look like an army.  It was this encroachment upon the very bodies of 
individuals that would lead to the event that may very well have started the decline of 
Reza's rule. 
                                                           




IV.  An Imperfect Balance: 
The Failure of Reza's Modernizing Campaign 
 
The Seeds of Discontent: Opposition to the Rule of Reza Shah 
 Reza's efforts to reshape Iran into a modern state, more accurately, into what he 
thought a modern state should be, were not simply accepted without objection.  The 
mandate that he had secured for himself had all but vanished by 1941, his pool of 
supporters had evaporated as his authoritarianism and brutality grew.  This thesis has 
already discussed tribal opposition to the centralizing impetus of Iran's reformers and the 
existence of other groups that struggled against the Tehran government.  Both of these 
elements predated Reza Shah's rule and could even be seen as contributing to his seizure 
of power.  What ultimately is indicative of his failure is the manner in which Iranians 
came to resist him.   
 Broadly, there were three social sectors that became disenchanted with Pahlavi 
rule.  First, the more traditional minded sector of Iranian society, the bazaaris, landed 
aristocracy, and the ulama, were unhappy with Reza Shah's push for the secularization of 
the public sphere and developments that eroded their authority, including conscription 
and dress codes, the impact of taxation on their livelihoods, and assaults against 
traditional social distinctions.  Second, the new middle class and intelligentsia resented 
his developing despotism and appetite for wealth.  Third, was the military itself.  It was 
noted above that there was a difference between the elite officers who surrounded the 
shah and the junior officers and conscripts who filled out the ranks.  Just putting on the 
uniform did not disconnect an officer from his political ideals, nor did military service 




speak to these innate factors, but his violent approach toward the slightest hint of 
opposition placed soldiers squarely between a leader they increasingly despised and a 
population that they did not.  Almost from the moment he launched the 1921 coup, Reza 
relied on muscle and manipulation to expand his power, gaining and losing allies along 
the way.  Over the course of his rule, however, he developed more enemies than friends.  
As early as 1931, American diplomat Charles C. Hart warned of coming trouble.  There 
was no question that opposition existed, that much was certain, but what remained to be 
seen was when exactly it would crystallize.367 
 Considering the animosity between the ulama and their supporters and Iran's 
modernizing nationalists, it is only logical that Reza Shah's rule would offend the 
traditional element of the country's population.  In the years preceding Reza's appearance 
on the political stage, a wave of anti-clericalism swept the budding intelligentsia.  Their 
enthusiasm for the new “religion” of Iranian nationalism was instrumental in helping 
push through many of the reforms of the early Pahlavi era.  Around the time of his 
coronation, a nationalist periodical stated bluntly that "the root of our evil is not 
insecurity, it is the class of the clergy.  If this root is not attacked soon, all the gains of the 
army and the army itself will vanish."368  Statements such as this illustrate the antipathy 
that Iran's modernizers felt for the clerical class and show, in part, why Reza's 
secularizing efforts could gain traction. 
 Virtually every aspect of Reza Shah's rule undermined the power of the ulama in 
some way.  The creation of a secular education system deprived them of influence over 
children, conscription loosened their hold on young men, the secularization of the legal 
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system pulled them further from the lives of adults, and so on.  The response of the 
clerics, if Iran is viewed through the prism of 1979, is quite surprising.  For the most part, 
they did nothing.369  There were, however, two notable exceptions to this.  Foremost,  
Sayyid Hassan Mudarres, a cleric from Isfahan and leading member of the Reformist 
party, from the start was an outspoken critic of conscription and of the possible 
establishment of a republic with Reza at the helm in 1924.370  After Reza Shah's 
coronation, in the subsequent shifting of political alliances and dissolution of political 
parties, Mudarres was driven out of politics altogether.371  He later died, under mysterious 
circumstances, after an incident at the Imam Reza shrine at Mashad in 1935.  The 
incident is another prominent, yet rare, example of the ulama forsaking quietism.  In July 
1935, the main preacher of the shrine took Reza's government to task, not only for its 
transgressions against Islam, but for its systemic corruption and economic policies, 
notably high taxes.  A crowd of people soon gathered to protest the "evil shah," and were 
only dispersed by gunfire that left hundreds dead.372  This incident was seen by many to 
mark a turning point in Reza Shah's reign and will be discussed in greater detail below.   
 With the ulama largely silent, the traditional middle class lacked the leadership 
necessary to mount an organized opposition.  After Reza's abdication, his opponents 
emerged with vociferous complaints against the nature of his rule, his disrespect for 
religion, excessive taxation, and elevation of the military over all else, but these were left 
unspoken while he was in power.  The expenses of military modernization drastically 
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increased the tax burden on the bazaaris, making them more inclined to turn against the 
regime.373  Mounting resentment against the shah's policies manifested itself in the 
actions of individuals or communities.  "Common people," not elites, were most willing 
to voice displeasure.  Iranians in rural areas, being more removed from government 
officials, appear to have only followed dress codes when absolutely necessary.  One 
village, for instance, was said to have just a single, communal Pahlavi hat, the 
government mandated male headgear, which would be worn by an individual going to 
town.374  Still, these acts of resistance remained independent and uncoordinated.  A 
British official, in 1938, noted that "although discontent with the present regime is almost 
universal...mullahs have for several years now been so oppressed that they have to a large 
extent lost their former influence and, in the absence of leaders, no overt opposition 
seems at all probable."375  Iran's traditionalists, though numerous, remained a silent 
majority.  Their frustration with the Pahlavi monarchy, while potent, simply did not have 
a real outlet and was not channeled into organized political action. 
 Reza Shah's relationship with the landed aristocracy was more complex.  When it 
came to Iran’s landed gentry, his policy was to “divide the upper-class families, co-opting 
some and pushing aside the others.”376  He associated himself with them through his own 
wealth and intermarriage, reduced their tax burden by placing agricultural taxes upon 
cultivators rather than landowners, and appointed many of his aristocratic allies to 
government positions.  At the same time, he abolished the old titles in the name of 
eradicating social distinctions and forced many landholders to sell their property at low 
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prices.377  Confiscated land often found its way into his own possession.378  Those 
aristocrats who aroused Reza's ire faced serious consequences.  The more fortunate were 
imprisoned, others were simply killed.  As Ervand Abrahamian observes, "[f]or members 
of the old upper class, life was certainly not poor, but it could easily turn nasty, brutish, 
and short."379  Given this climate of uncertainty, where individuals must live with the 
prospect of incarceration or death if they offend the ruler, it is easy to understand how the 
landed aristocracy would not necessarily harbor feelings of goodwill toward Reza's 
regime.  While Reza Shah retained supporters from the upper echelon of Iranian society 
until the end of his rule, there were still many members of the aristocracy who were not 
troubled by his departure. 
 The goodwill with which the intelligentsia and nationalists of Iran viewed Reza 
Shah also dissipated over time.  Far from bringing about a genuine transformation of the 
country's politics, Reza's leadership preserved the patrimonial order and merely 
introduced a new type of elite.  Iran’s parliamentary body, the majlis, was supervised by 
the military and functioned as little more than “a rubber stamp for the shah’s policies.”380  
It was also packed by his supporters from the upper classes.  Landowners accounted for 
more than one quarter of majlis seats in 1939, an increase from the eight per cent that 
they had occupied in 1909.381  Graduates of Iranian or foreign colleges could only 
progress so far through the bureaucratic ranks.  Only the shah's favorites could rise to the 
top.  Moreover, in 1933, a new deal was cut with the British regarding the Anglo-Iranian 
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Oil Company.382  This new agreement, the shah's quest for personal wealth, and his 
intolerance for dissent worked together through the 1930's to drive away supporters.383  
Lacking both real opportunities for advancement and the legal means for political 
expression, frustrated Iranians went underground.  A clandestine fascist group was 
formed and operated in the country until 1937.  At that point, its twenty members were 
discovered and its leader, a junior officer in the army, was executed for encouraging a 
coup against the shah.384  Another alleged plot, discovered the same year and possibly 
related, saw four junior officers executed and as many as six hundred people arrested.385 
 More consequential was the growth of communism in Iran.  Labor unions were 
banned in the country in 1927, and between that year and 1932, one hundred fifty labor 
organizers were arrested.386  Iranian communists, at home and abroad, organized strikes 
among students and workers and circulated Marxist tracts and antimonarchical 
propaganda.387  The government struck back in 1937, the same year that it clamped down 
on the aforementioned fascists, by arresting a large group of communists, who would 
later become immortalized as "the Fifty-three."  During the trial of the group leader, a 
disillusioned former nationalist named Taqi Arani, the accused scathingly remarked that 
"[i]f you wish to adopt...the Western way of life, you must also adopt Western political 
philosophies."388  Many of those arrested later formed the core of the Tudeh, Iran's 
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communist party.389  Even as communists, the Fifty-three retained strong nationalist 
underpinnings.  They emphasized Iranian unity and the need for a strong central 
government.  Even those who were of minority origins shared these values, and Arani 
himself, an ethnic Azeri born in Azerbaijan, had once written of the need to eliminate the 
Turkish language in Iran for the sake of national unity.390  Reza Shah‘s policies did little 
to discourage communist and other dissident groups from existing.  His abuse of power, 
his tendency to favor urban centers over rural areas, the corruption of the new 
government, the lack of political freedom, all of these factors and more helped to 
facilitate unrest.  In short, his apparent betrayal of true nationalist and modernist 
principles, drove the intelligentsia into action. 
 Even within the military, personnel unhappy with Reza's rule took action.  Several 
examples have already been cited above.  Resistance, however, began almost as soon as 
the 1921 coup ended.  In the first year after the coup, Reza worked to undermine the 
influence of the Gendarmerie by unifying the armed forces and promoting only Cossack 
officers into positions of authority.391  Not all Gendarmerie leaders accepted their second-
class positions without objection.  One of the more serious incidents of resistance was 
that of Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan Pasyan.  Colonel Pasyan was an officer in the 
Gendarmerie, a nationalist who led soldiers during the Great War and enjoyed 
widespread popularity due to his reputation as a talented and effective leader.392  
Although he initially supported the 1921 coup, he was dissatisfied with what he saw as 
the continuation of corruption and the patterns of traditional Qajar rule.  Following the 
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May 1921 replacement of Reza Shah's co-conspirator, Sayyid Zia Tabatabai, as Prime 
Minister by Qavam al-Saltanah, Pasyan took action.  Qavam had been arrested for 
corruption by Pasyan just a short time earlier.  As the new premier, he saw to it that the 
colonel was dismissed.393  Upon receiving this news, Pasyan decided to rebel and arrested 
potential opponents while working to recruit additional fighters until he commanded 
nearly four thousand men.394   
 This force embodied the threat posed to Reza Shah by the Gendarmerie, by its 
political, military, and democratic strength and appeal, in the early days after the coup.395  
With the bulk of its own military busy in Gilan, the Tehran government encouraged tribal 
forces around Pasyan, which it continued to rely upon to offset the weakness of the 
developing army, to rise up in rebellion.  Colonel Pasyan's four thousand soldiers were 
strained trying to confront these threats and he was killed during a battle with Kurdish 
fighters in October 1921.  His death removed a powerful and attractive potential rival 
from Reza's path.396  In this case, too, the central government was unable to confront a 
serious threat through its own military means.  In fact, Tehran's armed forces were busy 
fighting the Jangalis and could not confront both enemies at once.  Reza's reliance on 
tribal forces in lieu of his own reveals the general weakness, albeit early on, of Iran's 
forces.  Between 1921 and 1926, the Qajar practice of recruiting tribal levies continued 
out of military necessity, even as the government dreamed of establishing control over 
the country.397  Not long after Pasyan’s death, in early 1922, Major Abu'l Qasim Khan 
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Lahuti led a rebellion at Tabriz that was supported by many former Gendarmes.398  After 
government forces scattered his troops, he fled to the Soviet Union and became a poet.399   
 In the wake of the Pasyan and Lahuti uprisings, through 1922 and 1923, several 
plots to overthrow Reza's regime were allegedly discovered by the police.  Although 
there is considerable evidence that suggests that the conspiracies were in reality 
fabrications designed to eliminate Reza's, and others', political rivals, the fact that they 
could be constructed at all is revealing.400  The displeasure of the former Gendarmes must 
have been well known for such fabrications to be possible.  Hassan Arfa was in Tabriz 
during the early days of Lahuti's rebellion.  The Gendarmerie officers, he remembered, 
spoke openly of their resentment at being placed under the command of "ignorant" 
Cossacks.401  As the chief of the "ignorant Cossacks," Reza embodied a system that the 
Gendarmerie opposed.  When framed in these terms, essentially that the new leader had 
little trust or respect for the ex-Gendarmes, their opposition to him is understandable. 
 Reza's flirtation with republican government in 1924 also sparked opposition 
from the military.  Once again, the rift between former Cossacks and Gendarmes was a 
central issue.  The Cossacks supported Reza's efforts, owing to the loyalty they felt to one 
of their own.  It was not a reflection of their historical connection to representative 
government, as they had none.  Quite simply, they sided with their leader.  Among 
officers, the opposition was similarly personalized.  Ex-Gendarmes resisted the 
establishment of a republic along two primary grounds.  One camp, mainly sophisticated 
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officers loyal to the Qajar dynasty, were loathe to support the machinations and 
pretensions of "ignorant Cossacks."  The others were no friends to the Qajars, but felt that 
a republican government constructed under such circumstances would amount to a 
dictatorship under Reza.  They opposed, not the idea of a republic, but the ambitions of 
Reza Shah.402  Despite being deprived of high-ranking leadership positions, former 
Gendarmerie officers and soldiers found ways to resist.  Groups of men passed 
resolutions stating that they would not fight to establish a republic.  Others opted to 
remain passive and stayed in their barracks during the crisis.  The rank and file, in 
particular, because of their ties to the ulama, were vehemently opposed to the republican 
project.  They openly defied orders and, at least on one occasion, physically assaulted 
individuals who voiced support of Reza's plans.  One historian has even noted that if 
army officers would have been forced to follow through on their threat to march on 
Tehran following Reza's resignation, many of their soldiers would not have followed 
them.403   
 Although the military became the central pillar of Reza's rule, the common soldier 
did not necessarily reap the benefits of their new importance.  Especially in the early 
days, the average conscript continued to be poorly treated, poorly fed, and poorly paid.  
So many men died in the Tehran garrison in 1931 that medical officers were brought in to 
oversee their treatment.404  Because the ills of the Qajar system persisted into the new 
army, even the increasing budget was not sufficient to match its expansion.  By the time 
corrupt officers siphoned off what money they wanted, there was not enough left to pay 
the common soldier.  Left to fend for themselves, the soldiers turned on Iran's civilian 
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population, extorting and looting to fulfill their needs.  Occasionally, they would desert or 
ignore their officers.405  This continued abuse led to uprisings that finally culminated in 
1926.   
 That year, a series of mutinies erupted as soldiers protested their mistreatment.  
Officers numbered among the participants, including one who sought refuge in a mosque 
to escape a commander who wanted to extort from him a share of the money that he was 
assumed to have extorted from his men.406  The fact that a senior officer would 
automatically assume that his subordinates were also corrupt illustrates how widespread 
the abuse of power in Reza's army truly was.  Initially, the central government relied 
upon force, or the threat of it, to put down these rebellions.  In 1926, however, faced with 
simultaneous insurrections around the country, Reza Shah addressed the roots of the 
unrest and made a personal effort to bring about more tolerable conditions.  The situation 
stabilized by the end of the year as conditions for soldiers began to improve, but Iranians, 
including the shah, were shaken by the mutinies and the thought of what might have 
happened if the armed forces disintegrated.407  While there would not be any subsequent 
uprisings of the 1926 scale, isolated acts of rebellion or resistance continued to take 
place, such as in 1941 when an aircraft performing in a parade abruptly changed 
directions and flew to the Soviet Union.408  Still, the absence of organized resistance did 
not indicate that all was well, as events in the summer of 1935 would reveal. 
 On July 10, 1935, the custodian of the Imam Reza shrine in Mashad delivered an 
impassioned sermon to worshippers there.  It was the twenty-fourth anniversary of a 
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Russian bombardment of the shrine.  Emotions were running high.  The cleric 
condemned the national dress codes imposed by the shah, particularly the mandatory 
unveiling of women, corruption, and high taxes.409  His message struck a chord with the 
audience.  People began tearing up their hated Western caps, and when the police were 
sent to disperse the crowd, they were rebuffed with stone throwing.  Army units were 
called in to serve as reinforcements and attempted again to disperse the crowd the next 
day.  A scuffle broke out and, in the heat of the moment, the commander of the troops 
gave the order to fire.  Dozens were killed before the army withdrew for the day, leaving 
the crowd and the instigators in possession of the mosque.  The next day, the number of 
protestors had grown larger and had begun to invoke Imam Hussein against the shah.  
Even more people packed into the shrine over the next few days while government 
leaders tried to negotiate an end to the standoff.  Finally, the military forced open the 
doors and sprayed the crowds with fire from machine guns, bringing the episode to a 
close.  More than a hundred people were killed, with hundreds more wounded.410  For 
several reasons, it would be remembered as a watershed moment. 
 The Mashad incident is more than just an example of clerical opposition to Reza 
Shah's policies.  Iranian soldiers numbered among the dead, and not by the hands of the 
protestors.  Two soldiers were executed by their own officers because they refused to fire 
on civilians.  Another committed suicide.411  Several officers were later arrested because 
of the lack of discipline among the rank and file-- namely because the conscripts were 
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reluctant to kill their countrymen.412  The local garrison was even disarmed, confined to 
their barracks, and given a feast, while machine guns were kept trained on them, because 
they were known to sympathize with the protestors.413  Beyond showing the brutality of 
Reza Shah's regime, the Mashad episode reveals tensions within the military.  Obedience 
was not necessarily assured, and the regime realized this.  Some men would rather die 
than serve as Reza Shah's enforcers.  Moreover, the incident signaled the emergence of a 
noticeable gap between the government and the populace.  Iranians began to circulate 
rumors that the Pahlavi dynasty would soon fall, and American diplomat Burton Y. Berry 
warned that the government was "getting onto precarious ground."414  More subdued 
dispatches still pointed out that the shah had lost considerable popularity because of the 
massacre and also that it was the most serious incident faced by Reza Shah yet.415 
 Considering the earlier words of diplomats, essentially warnings, regarding Reza's 
character, the Mashad massacre could almost be expected.  In 1934, American diplomat 
George Wadsworth scathingly branded the shah a violent "oriental despot" who would 
crush everything he distrusted.  Even worse, Wadsworth noted, Reza lacked pity and 
demonstrated brutality in a distinctly "occidental" way.416  Reza appeared to straddle the 
worst of two worlds.  After the Mashad shootings it became obvious, as one historian has 
written, that "the gulf between the shah and his army and the Iranian people had grown 
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irredeemably wide."417  Foreign diplomatic reports from the country took notice of this 
gap.  In eastern Iran, one 1938 British report noted, discontent with Reza's regime was 
universal.418  An American report the same year expanded on this, saying the shah was 
secure only because civilians feared him, and that his policies guaranteed further 
dissatisfaction in the future.419  Two years later, in 1940, the British military attaché in 
the country warned that German propaganda had an attentive audience in the vast 
numbers of unhappy Iranians.420  This was something echoed by American diplomats, 
who claimed that the country's economic malaise had led to unprecedented complaining 
and that German and Soviet propaganda was expected to cause serious trouble.421  These 
reports point to a number of reasons for discontent, but the personalized nature of the 
shah's rule left him as the target for dissatisfaction.  Whether the cause of unhappiness 
was corruption, violence, repression, economic misery, or more, the shah was ultimately 
held responsible. 
 A letter written by an American official in Tehran in January 1941 speaks to how 
poor the relationship between Reza Shah and his people had become.  The letter stresses 
that German and Soviet propaganda was being circulated throughout the country.  With 
anti-regime sentiment growing rapidly, the author warned, a German-sponsored 
revolution seemed imminent.  The author was not simply being melodramatic.  With the 
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help of several diplomatic officials, the author had constructed a secret transmitter to use 
during the anticipated impending crisis, and offered a list of potential frequencies that 
could be used to communicate in the event of an emergency.  Expecting the worst, they 
had rigged the unit to run off a car battery.  After describing these preparations, the 
author ominously writes, "no doubt that you grasp what is in our minds here."422  What 
was in their minds was that the Pahlavi regime's days were numbered, that the 
government and population had ceased to work together and would soon come into open 
conflict.  This letter, written months before the Allied invasion of Iran, shows that 
opposition to Reza Shah and his cohorts had become so great that the entire house of 
cards would come crashing down with a breath.  In this estimation, they were correct.  
Where they were wrong was the source.  It was not through the work of German 
propagandists that Reza's rule was brought to an end, but by Allied intervention in the 
summer of 1941.  If Iranian society had become a powder keg, the guns of the British and 
Soviet armies would provide the spark. 
 
The Matter of Performance:  Reza's Army in Action 
 The performance of Iran's armies in the field illustrates how the military and other 
reforms enacted by Reza Shah impacted the national security of the country.  The armed 
forces were able, either by force or the threat of it, to defeat domestic opposition, but 
were wholly unable to repel invasion by powerful foreign powers.  More importantly for 
the question of military effectiveness, the army did not emerge victorious from every 
battle with tribal or domestic opponents.  Success was never guaranteed.  Defeats still 
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occurred and the government preferred to engage in combat only as a last resort.  As will 
be shown, the military under Reza Shah was primarily a political tool designed to coerce 
and deter opponents into cooperation, as its success on the battlefield could not be 
guaranteed.  In the words of one historian, "[w]ar in Iran was as much about the threat of 
force as the use of force."423  To rephrase the matter more generally, and perhaps more 
eloquently, Reza constructed his armies in accordance with a later adage that states that 
"power perceived is power achieved."424 
 While it is generally accepted that Reza Shah was able to overcome the 
traditionally fractious nature of Iran to forge a cohesive modern state, this was not a 
mission accomplished solely or principally through combat.  Stephanie Cronin goes so 
far as to say that the army had "little or nothing to do with the government's victory [over 
the tribes,] which resulted from a combination of factors, including a lack of unity among 
the tribes, their shortage of ammunition, and the political handling of the situation by the 
Tehran authorities."425  This is a slight overstatement.  While it is true that the military 
weakness of the Iran inherited by Reza Shah would, expectedly, force the new regime to 
explore alternative methods of exercising influence over peripheral areas, the role of the 
army in putting down internal challenges cannot be ignored.  By virtue of its existence 
and the development of it by Reza Shah, the Iranian military certainly played a part in 
politicians negotiating solutions to conflicts.  The Iranian army might never have 
achieved decisive victories over the central government’s many domestic opponents, but 
its importance as a political tool cannot be overstated. 
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 Combat operations against tribal and domestic opponents faced a number of 
difficulties apart from the issues discussed above.  In the early 1920's, tribal forces were 
better armed than Reza's military, they operated in remote areas where they had a clear 
advantage, and the presence of government forces, due to the lack of discipline, meant 
robbery and violence would take place in the area, further alienating and inciting the very 
people that Tehran was trying to pacify.426  These factors, together with the state of the 
armed forces at this time, meant that military campaigns were not a preferred method of 
subjugation but a last resort.  An aim of this study, however, is to assess the military 
effectiveness of Iran's forces, not the tribal policies of the Pahlavi dynasty.427  The 
performance of the Iranian military in confronting domestic opposition is of primary 
interest. 
 It is useful to distinguish between tribal opposition and opponents motivated by 
ideological or political reasons.  If the goal of Reza Shah and his supporters was to 
incorporate the tribal population into a modern state, their goal regarding those who 
threatened the state, or the ruling regime, on an ideological basis was destruction, not 
assimilation.  The foremost political threat faced by Reza Shah had been posed by 
Kuchik Khan's movement in Gilan, discussed in chapter two.  With Soviet assistance in 
1921, Kuchik Khan's Jangali forces made a move on Tehran that was repulsed by Iran's 
Cossacks.  The deflection of the Jangali attack bought enough time for the government to 
secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country.428  Even with the Gilani rebels, 
Reza Shah did engage in negotiations, but only with those on the political right, and 
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possibly only to further fragment the uprising, which was rife with internal dissension of 
its own.429  After a group of Jangalis violated a cease fire and killed Iranian soldiers, Reza 
ordered an attack and scattered the remaining fighters.  Kuchik Khan froze to death while 
fleeing government forces, officially ending the Gilan Republic.430  Critical to 
understanding Iran's military efficacy is the fact that victory came only after the opponent 
had been weakened politically.  More revealing is that the Jangalis had divided their 
fighters into three groups, a physical fissure to complement the political rift, which 
allowed them to be confronted and destroyed piecemeal.431 
 A rough evolution of Iran's military can be seen when its performance against the 
various tribes is examined.  As stated, the first few years of Reza Shah's rule saw the 
armed forces as unreliable and often outgunned by tribal fighters.432  Years of ineffectual 
Qajar rule had left the military impotent and given little respect by both its opponents and 
its members.  As a military officer, Hassan Arfa recognized that, "[w]hen dealing with 
tribes authority is inseparable from prestige."433  In the early days of Reza’s rule, Iran’s 
army would suffer the consequences of its poor reputation.  Arfa recounts a stark report 
given to him in 1921 by the survivor of a defeat at the hands of tribal forces.  Reports that 
Kurdish fighters, under the command of the notorious Simko, were preparing to attack 
were ignored by the Iranian commander.434  When the rumors proved accurate, the 
government soldiers were wholly unprepared and were driven back before being forced 
to surrender.  Between battlefield deaths and the massacre of prisoners, less than half of 
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the five hundred men survived.435  Arfa also tells of personal defeats suffered at the hands 
of Simko's Kurds in 1921.  The first of these came as Iranian soldiers attempted to move 
on Kurdish positions.  Simko's men recognized their enemies' plans and launched an 
attack, killing more than two hundred men and forcing them to retreat.   
 Arfa notes that, even though they were outnumbered, his soldiers fought 
courageously.  The problem was that there was not enough ammunition for the British 
Lee-Enfield rifles that his men carried, while Russian and French weapons and 
ammunition were plentiful throughout the countryside.  In order to survive, the soldiers 
were forced to requisition French Lebel rifles and ammunition from civilians while their 
own ammunition made its three weeks-long trip, via horse-drawn wagon, from Tehran.  
The second defeat came not long after the first.  Arfa attempted to relocate what remained 
of his command into a more favorable position.  Unfortunately for these soldiers, the 
Kurds had been informed of the movements and ambushed Arfa and his men.  Nearly 
half of the government detachment would be lost in the ensuing firefight, including Arfa's 
personal orderly, who delayed his own retreat to help his commander remove a prized 
saddle from a dead horse.436  In 1926, a garrison at Sardasht was attacked and routed by 
tribal fighters.437  These experiences highlight the difficulties that Iranian soldiers faced 
in the first years of Reza's rule.  Without sufficient ammunition, modern rifles are useless.  
With commanders who ignore possible intelligence or risk lives to recover personal 
property, bravery is wasted.  Altogether, with insufficient numbers, insufficient arms, and 
deeply flawed leaders, the military faced unfavorable odds against a better led, better 
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equipped, and better informed foe.   
 Still, it would be wrong to say that the military was ineffective.  In the end Reza 
Shah did prevail over tribal opponents.  Battlefield victory and defeat were interspersed, 
with a preponderance of neither.  Iran's armies neither rolled across the countryside like a 
steamroller nor invariable fell, waiflike, before the slightest hint of opposition.  The 
difficulties faced by the early small detachments of soldiers sent to put down revolts led 
Reza Shah to supplement these forces with his own tribal allies.  The advantages afforded 
by these seasoned fighters were increased exponentially by the use of aircraft that 
allowed nomadic tribes to be located and met where the government would have the 
upper hand.  As new roads extended from Tehran deeper into the countryside, the Iran's 
forces were able to dispatch more soldiers, more quickly, to more remote locations.  Reza 
Shah's grip on the country was tightened with every new mile of the fourteen thousand 
miles of roads that were constructed between 1923 and 1938.438  By 1932, Iran's tribes 
had been subdued enough, by armed force or political maneuvering, for the government 
to create a department within the Ministry of the Interior tasked with creating a 
sedentarization plan.439   
 A progression can be seen in the development of the Iranian military when 
considering the developments between 1921 and the 1930's.  Originally ill-equipped, 
shown little respect, and forced to deal with the primitive conditions of the country, the 
force became better equipped, better respected, and saw the condition of the 
infrastructure improve markedly.  Still, most of these changes were tied to perception.  In 
public discourse, the military was presented as a heroic force that put down tribal 
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uprisings, while the reality was that tribal levies were needed to assist government forces 
into the early 1930‘s.  Training continued to be poor and logistical problems went 
unaddressed.440  What was most important was that Iran's armed forces looked like a 
modern army, and with each year this appeared to be, more and more, the case.  A 1936 
British report remarked that the Iranian government had "erected an imposing facade of 
guns for which there are no shells, of aeroplanes they cannot maintain, of vehicles they 
cannot drive, and of mechanical devices they cannot comprehend."441  The invasion of 
Iran by Britain and the Soviet Union in 1941 would show that behind the facade of 
modernity, the foundation and framework of the military were anything but sound. 
 On August 25, 1941, the shortcomings of Iran's armed forces were dramatically 
exposed by the Allied invasion, dubbed the "unhappy event of Shahrivar (August)" by 
Iranians.442  It seems as though the outcome of such an attack was expected by 
international observers.  Recall that American officials had viewed aircraft deliveries to 
Iran as handouts to the Soviet Union in the event of an invasion, a statement the author 
dryly finished with, "the Iranians are not last-ditch fighters."443  At other times, 
repeatedly, Americans had noted deficiencies in Reza Shah's armies.  Its armored cars 
were vulnerable to modern weapons, much of its artillery was antiquated, its men prone 
to disorder, and its aircraft either in disrepair or unarmed.  On the eve of the invasion, 
American diplomats saw the Iranian army for what it really was:  built for internal 
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security, not international defense.444  One went so far as to make a bold and 
frighteningly accurate prediction regarding the country's immediate future.  Allied 
demands would be refused, he speculated, Iran would be invaded, its armies would offer 
brief resistance, and the shah would likely lose the throne.445  Winston Churchill was 
more cautious, concerned with the well-being of British nationals in the country and the 
security of the country's infrastructure, mainly airfields, railways, and oil fields.  Still, the 
ultimate success of the operation was never in doubt, and reinforcements were planned if 
resistance was stronger than expected.446  The Soviets seem to have harbored few 
reservations as to the likelihood of victory.  The discipline and order of Red Army 
soldiers in the occupation force, their strangely gracious dealings with Iranian officials, 
and the quality of the personnel, Persian speakers who were familiar with the culture, 
whom they dispatched to the country447 suggest that Soviet planning had progressed far 
beyond the scope of military operations.  It is practically unthinkable that the Soviet 
Union would not be aware of the strength of Iran's armed forces, in large part because of 
the penetration of the country by communist agents.448 
 Iran was caught unprepared for the Allied assault.  In spite of the long-standing 
enmity between Iran and the Soviets, no modern fortifications along the northern border 
had been constructed before 1940.449  Iran's armies have been characterized as only being 
"at a medium state of alert," with weapons being secured in armories and soldiers 
continuing the routine of sleeping in and cleaning their barracks.  A commander even 
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entertained his subordinates with stories of tribal campaigns, keeping them up late into 
the night.  British reconnaissance flights were ignored, without even a single fighter sent 
to chase away the intruder.450  Eventually, tens of thousands of reservists were activated, 
but they were never assigned to active units and would play no role in defending the 
country.451  Full-scale mobilization never took place.  The explanation offered by the 
younger Pahlavi, Reza's son, for this apparent reluctance to prepare for the Allied 
onslaught highlights the rift between Iran's leadership and society, reality and the 
propaganda that those in power seemed to believe.  According to Mohammad Reza Shah, 
the shah was surrounded by advisors who lacked the courage to tell him the truth.452  
Nobody wanted to be the bearer of bad news, either to state what should have been 
obvious about the coming invasion or to point out the unfavorable condition of Iran's 
armies. 
 Hassan Arfa served on a Supreme War Council tasked by the shah in early 1941 
with preparing a defensive plan in the event of an invasion.  Arfa sought to use the 
country's geography in conjunction with strategic withdrawals to delay the enemy 
advance, perhaps buying time for a negotiated settlement.  Another officer formulated a 
defensive scheme that involved protecting the entire northern border against attack.  The 
latter was accepted, Arfa says, corroborating Mohammad Reza Shah's claim, because 
nobody wanted to admit that the army was incapable of protecting the territorial integrity 
of the country.  He goes on to say that Reza Shah most likely knew that such a defense 
was impossible, but that he viewed its adoption as necessary to maintain morale.453  Even 
                                                           
450 Ward, Immortal, 155. 
451 Arfa, Under Five Shahs, 277. 
452 Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, 70. 




Iranian officials seem to have been unwilling to recognize the severity of the situation.  In 
a meeting with an American diplomat, one such official said that British aggression was 
"unthinkable" and that the Soviets were too preoccupied with the Germans to attack but, 
if they did, Iran's forces could meet the challenge.454  So, while civilians with the means 
to do so were evacuating border regions,455 Hassan Arfa's report, made just weeks before 
the invasion, that British hospitals in Iraq were increasing their accommodations and 
armored units were operating along the border, was dismissed by the Chief of Staff.456  
When Allied soldiers began streaming across the border, the prime minister refused to 
wake the sleeping shah, and then waited until he had finished his breakfast to deliver the 
bad news.457  There can be little wonder why Iran's army was caught by surprise and 
overwhelmed. 
 As for the battlefield performance of Iran's forces during the invasion, there is 
remarkably little to say.  Even Mohammad Reza Shah, successor to the throne, conceded 
that "the resistance of the Iranian armed forces was completely ineffective" and had 
virtually ceased even before the official cease fire signed three days later.458  Another 
pro-Pahlavi text claims that Reza's armies were suited for "normal duties" but could not 
offer the Soviets and British anything more than "token resistance."459  Other works 
describe the force as having "melted away in an instant"460 or "hardly fired a shot in the 
defense of the country."461  Power was so centralized in the person of the shah, he 
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dominated the government to such an extent, that officers were generally not willing to 
act independently.  As one historian has argued, "the entire country depended directly on 
Reza; the shah was too insecure to delegate authority."462  When Reza Shah was finally 
informed of the attack, he ordered that Tehran be defended, but gave no instructions to 
units that had already been engaged.463  In fact, Iran's units had been placed in defensive 
positions before the invasion and were forbidden to move.  The only force that did 
relocate found itself, because of the inflexibility of other units, easily outflanked and 
unable to retreat because its equipment could not be transported.  Hassan Arfa assumed 
that the absence of instructions for soldiers or to destroy strategic bridges or railways 
meant that the shah had no desire to put up a real defense.464  Arfa simply could not 
accept that the institutional and material deficiencies of the military could cause such 
paralysis.  Iran’s forces were too poorly led to put up any effective, coordinated 
resistance. 
 There are examples of the Iranians offering considerable resistance to the 
invaders, such as the intense fighting in defense of Abadan, Khorramshahr, or in the 
western mountains.  It must be pointed out, however, that these were isolated incidents 
and were led by local commanders operating on their own initiative.465  These cases were 
not the rule.  Courage alone cannot be considered a substitute for effective leadership and 
adequate preparation.  Even when led by competent commanders, Iranian soldiers were 
still too poorly trained and ill-equipped to resist the overwhelming British and Soviet 
attacks.  British consul Sir Clarmont Skrine recalls these areas as putting up a fight, but 
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notes that the majority of Iran's forces were either routed without difficulty or easily 
outmaneuvered.466  This view is echoed by Winston Churchill, who remarks that the 
country's oil fields, the first objective, were "easily captured," that certain areas, as 
Hassan Arfa would agree, would have been a "definite obstacle" if seriously defended, 
and sums up the hostilities in a letter to a British general by saying that "Persian 
opposition is not very serious."467   
 Aside from isolated pockets of vigorous resistance, however, Iran's forces fell by 
the wayside with little fanfare.  The deficiencies of the officer corps were exposed as 
commanders fled to safety.468  One even had ammunition taken off transports to make 
room for his personal furniture before a retreat.  Others stripped off their uniforms and 
escaped to Tehran.469  Without leaders, poorly trained and demoralized soldiers deserted 
in droves.  The rout was so complete that commanders in Tehran questioned if they still 
had any soldiers under their command.470  Many of those who attempted to resist found 
that they faced unexpected difficulties.  In Tabriz, armorers and quartermasters had no 
rations for their soldiers and could offer each only five rounds of ammunition.471   
 A wartime book published in Britain dealing with the air war in the Middle East 
between 1940 and 1942 devotes little more than a page to the invasion of Iran.  By 
contrast, the affair in Habbaniya, Iraq, receives eleven pages of lurid detail.  There are no 
accounts of harrowing encounters with Iranian aircraft or even ground fire, and the piece 
has a decidedly lighthearted tone to it, remarking that British bombers "regaled the 
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populations" of Iran's cities with the "informing literature" of Allied propaganda.472  This 
is not the hallmark of a hard-fought campaign.  Britain's ambassador to the United States 
informed the American Secretary of State on August 26th, the day after the invasion 
began, that the operation had been successful, "without serious incident," and that 
Iranians in Tehran felt that the nation's defense effort had been staged by the shah with 
the matter of occupation planned with his consent.473  In any case, it was a miserable 
showing, described eloquently in Winston Churchill's eulogy for the operation:  "Thus 
ended this brief and fruitful exercise of overwhelming force against a weak and ancient 
state."474  Mercifully, the war in Iran was over almost as soon as it began. 
 The vaunted Iranian military, Reza Shah's darling, whose guns, tanks, and aircraft 
consumed so much of the country's budget for two decades could not even muster a 
sufficient defense to convince its citizens, including Hassan Arfa, that it made a genuine 
effort to combat the invaders.  Of such potency was the mythology of the strong national 
army-- the allegedly valiant force that subdued the tribes and forged a modern nation with 
blood and iron-- that nobody could fathom its true weakness and ineptitude.  In the midst 
of an otherwise total defeat, the success of his regime’s propaganda was Reza Shah's only 
victory.  The political posturing involved with building Iran's army had served its purpose 
and convinced the population of its power.  Unfortunately for the shah, his eventual 
acceptance of his own propaganda would doom his rule.  The modern army that he had 
labored for nearly two decades to build did not even exist.  After continuing to politically 
antagonize the Allied occupation force, Reza Shah abdicated as Soviet soldiers entered 
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Tehran.  He would die in exile, under the watchful eye of the British, in July 1944.475 
 
Conclusion: Semblance over Substance 
 Reza Shah came to power in a state lacking central authority and soon adopted the 
nationalist program of modernization via the establishment of a strong government with 
the power to forcibly unify and alter society.  To Reza, this could only be accomplished 
through the force provided by a strong national army.  This force was to be the central 
pillar of the state, both symbolically and materially.  At times, more than half the budget 
would be consumed by defense-related spending, to the detriment of the social and 
economic development of the country.  The 1935 budget, for example, set aside 
223,729,980 rials for the Ministry of War while the Ministry of Education received 
31,798,250 rials, little more than a tenth of what was spent on defense.  Just two million 
rials were to be used for hospital construction in Tehran.476  In spite of its favored 
position, the military that developed during Reza's reign had serious shortcomings.  Far 
too many ills of the Qajar period, the endemic corruption and political wrangling, were 
permitted to persist as the armed forces grew in strength.  Illiterate conscripts spent more 
time receiving primary education than learning how to be soldiers.  Though their numbers 
were increasing, there remained a dearth of competent professionals in the officer corps.  
In 1941, fewer than 2,100 officers had graduated from Iran's military academies477 out of 
the more than 3,000 total officers within the military.  Materially, Iran's forces fared 
better than ever before.  Modern weapons, tanks, and aircraft had been added while the 
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capability for domestic arms production had begun to develop.  Still, equipment remained 
in short supply, was poorly maintained, and had few well-trained individuals to operate 
them.  Even as the country faced invasion, many frontline soldiers were still equipped 
with training rifles.478  The personnel and other factors combined to mean that the Iranian 
military was more impressive on the parade ground than on the battlefield. 
 The projection of the appearance of strength was a cornerstone of Reza Shah's 
regime.  If the sophisticated modern aircraft and vehicles purchased by Iranian officials 
seemed extravagant, it was by design.  By having modern military hardware, Reza Shah 
could claim the prestige of possessing the same arms operated by powerful Western 
nations.  When shopping for new aircraft in the United States, Iran would not settle for 
less capable export models, instead demanding only those that the Americans had 
adopted for themselves.  Reza did not care if even the Americans found it difficult to fly 
these planes.  Possession trumped practicality.  These expensive weapons were far too 
valuable, not in a monetary, but in a symbolic sense, to risk losing on the battlefield.  
Consequently, armored cars and aircraft were kept close to Tehran in the first years of 
Reza's rule, where they would be most visible and therefore politically beneficial.  In 
contrast to his reputation, when confronting tribal opponents, Reza Shah was loathe to 
apply armed force.  A military solution to tribal rebellions ran the risk of potentially 
endangering the prestige of the armed forces if the government troops were defeated.  
Instead, Reza focused on achieving negotiated settlements until circumstances turned in 
his favor.  By using these tactics, he was able to wear down tribal resistance until the 
military supremacy of the government was assured.  1932 marked the beginning of the 
Ministry of the Interior's oversight of efforts to sedentarize Iran's tribes.  Prior to this, 
                                                           




settlement of the tribes was a purely military effort.479  Against the Allied invasion a 
decade later, however, such an approach was useless.  Iran's parade-ground army was 
overwhelmed, in many cases before it could even contemplate resistance.  When it did 
resist, it invariably succumbed to the vastly superior firepower of the British and Soviet 
armies.  Granted, the combined Anglo-Soviet armies were larger, better armed, better 
equipped, and more experienced than anything the Iranians could muster, but the rapidity 
with which Iran's forces disintegrated is astonishing.  The military strength that Reza 
Shah had presented was little more than a facade. 
 The triumph of semblance over substance extended far beyond simply the shape 
of Iran's armed forces.  More than being favored politically and financially, the military 
was venerated in public discourse.  Reza Shah's legitimacy was drawn, in part, from his 
martial prowess.  He presented himself, possibly even fancied himself, as the warrior 
king.  A part of grooming the Crown Prince for the throne was his military instruction, 
and his participation in scouting and military drill were flaunted.  To Reza Shah, military 
service was an integral part of citizenship, and conscription ensured that young men from 
around the country would be drawn into the machinery of the state, but the veneration of 
masculinity relegated women to second-class status.  In books and parades, the armed 
forces were presented as the protectors of Iranian sovereignty, as magnificent examples 
of the strength of the new Iran.  The civilian population was groomed to serve as literal 
soldiers or as figurative soldiers in the service of the state.  Iranian boys were obligated to 
join scouting organizations that emphasized physical fitness and martial discipline.480  
The handling of weapons and military drill became as much a part of their education as 
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academic subjects and were taught to them by army officers.  Iran's adults, while not 
forced to parade, were still expected to serve the state.  National dress codes ensured a 
standard of uniformity among the population, with Reza Shah seemingly willing 
Westernization into being by making Iranians appear more Western.  Reza Shah's 
government sought to use the military as a model for society, thinking that the military 
would serve as a conduit to modernize the population.   
 Foreign observers were aware of the shortcomings of Reza's modernization 
program.  Western newspaper articles wryly commented on the presence of railroad 
stations without rail service, financial districts that lacked buildings, and opera houses 
that were without operas.481  Generally, Reza Shah's reforms have been characterized as 
falling short of the "depth and breadth" of those in Turkey, as "the old social structure 
and the traditional patrimonialism were strongly protected" during his reign.482  The 
traditional Qajar elite were simply replaced by a new privileged class of military 
officials.483  Without creating outlets for political expression, by stifling a free press, 
refusing to tolerate any indication of dissent, and banning political parties, he left Iranians 
without a voice or a role in politics.  Resentment was left to build up, frustration left to 
fester and grow, just below the surface.  Occasionally, such as Mashad in 1935, the 
dissatisfaction felt by many Iranians boiled over. 
 In 1938, an American diplomatic report had made a remarkably accurate 
assessment of the state of affairs in Iran.  The military stood at the center of the state and 
represented the vanguard of modernity.  Reza Shah sought, not to expand the country's 
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borders or to align it with a stronger power, but to remain neutral while assuring the 
sovereignty of the state.  Although he admired the accomplishments of the fascist and 
Nazi movements, and even though German economic penetration of the country was 
widespread, the shah was unlikely to allow either of these factors to influence his policies 
toward Europe.  At home, the shah was secure in his position, supported by the best army 
east of Turkey, and feared by the civilian population.  But all was not well within the 
country.  Reza Shah's policies had generated considerable resentment that showed no 
signs of abatement.  Moreover, because there was no free press and because there were 
no political parties, he had lost touch with his subjects.  The basic political dynamics of 
the country needed to change.484   
 Iranian politics did change, but not because Reza commanded it, and not along the 
lines necessary to win popular support.  After the Allied invasions humiliated Iran's 
armed forces, Reza Shah's rule began to unravel.  To win the favor of the Iranian public, 
the British broadcast propaganda exposed the shah's abuses of power.485  The world 
watched as the drama unfolded.  One newspaper article, written September 15, 1941, 
discussed the shah's increasing unpopularity, even rehashed rumors that Reza was 
making preparations to flee the country.486  A day later, not knowing that he had 
abdicated, another paper reported that Iran's tribes were uniting in opposition to him.487  
When his abdication was announced, a British paper referred to his reign as "a detested 
rule."488  A few days later, another newspaper tried to make sense of Reza's departure.  
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After twenty years of autocracy, it reasoned, the Iranian people had grown tired.  Since 
the military was the key to the shah's power, its destruction took his power with it.  The 
Allied invasion simply allowed the Iranian people to have their own way.489  Obviously, 
these reports reflect the wartime needs of the Allies.  Britain and the Soviets needed a 
reliable and compliant partner in Iran, and Reza lacked the temperament to play that role.  
His reign was likely doomed the moment the invasion began. 
 The aforementioned 1938 American report, while accurate, did not anticipate a 
military invasion of the country.  It was, however, strangely prophetic.  Although it 
contended that Reza Shah was secure, it warned that the country's politics needed to 
change.  If not, it predicted, the Crown Prince would be challenged for power.490  As 
stated earlier, Mohammad Reza Shah emulated his father.  With a few exceptions, the 
policies of the younger Pahlavi looked quite similar to his predecessor.  If Iranian politics 
remained unchanged from the policies of Reza Shah, the 1938 report cautioned, the 
population needed only organization, leadership, and a common objective to cause 
havoc.491  Almost half a century later, this prognostication proved correct.  Reza Shah 
would lose his throne over military miscalculations before the consequences of his 
modernization program fully developed, but he had unwittingly unleashed forces that 
would eventually bring about the end of 2500 years of Iranian monarchy.   
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